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Millennium Approaches: The Future of
the Voting Rights Act After Shaw,
De Grandy, and Holder
by
ANDREA BiRST.E *
"It's all gone too far.., we should stop somehow, go back"'
Introduction
In 1993 and 1994, the Supreme Court decided three voting rights
cases with potentially serious impact on minority representation and
the way we think about voting rights.2 In Shaw v. Reno,3 the Court
held that race-based districting is subject to strict scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment when it results in geographically peculiar dis-
tricts. In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court saw such race-
based districting as "an effort to segregate voters into separate voting
districts because of their race," and held that such a practice might
violate the Equal Protection Clause.4
* Associate Professor, Western New England College School of Law. I wish to
thank the faculty and administration of Western New England College School of Law for
their support and their thoughtful critiques, with special thanks to Dean Joan Mahoney
and to Anne Goldstein. This project was supported by a summer Research Grant from
Western New England College School of Law.
1. ToNY KusHmR, ANGELS IN AM ERCA, PART Two: PERsTRoncA, act 2, sc. 2
(1992).
2. In June, 1995, as this article was going to press, the Supreme Court decided yet
another voting rights case, Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). The Miller case does
not change the basic thrust of my analysis. Wherever possible, however, I have tried to
note where the Miller decision sheds additional light one way or another. I have not at-
tempted a full treatment of that case, nor its companion case, United States v. Hays, 115 S.
Ct. 2431 (1995) in this piece.
3. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
4. Id. at 2832. The Court did not find such districts per se illegal. Rather, the Court
held that race-based districting is subject to strict scrutiny. Thus, a "majority-minority"
district could be upheld if it were shown either that the district was not "an effort to segre-
gate voters into separate voting districts because of their race," or that, even if it was, such
separation was "narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest." Id- On
remand, the district court in Shaw upheld the race-based district, finding that it was, in-
deed, narrowly tailored to further the state's compelling interest in eliminating vestiges of
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In Johnson v. De Grandy,5 while upholding a race-based district-
ing plan as comporting with the Voting Rights Act, the Court held
that the Voting Rights Act does not require that minority representa-
tion be maximized. Nor, the Court added, does it provide a "safe har-
bor" against vote-dilution claims for districting that reflects the
proportion of a minority group in the population.6 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed that the Voting Rights Act prece-
dents permitted, indeed required, some forms of race-based district-
ing, but suggested that for that reason, the Act might be
unconstitutional. 7 Finally, in Holder v. Hall,8 the Court held that sec-
tion 2 of the Voting Rights Act could not be used to challenge the size
of a local government, when governmental size was alleged to be dilu-
tive of minority voting strength, because such a challenge would re-
quire the Court to address the question of what the appropriate voting
strength of the minority ought to be.9 Justice Thomas, joined by Jus-
tice Scalia, concurred in a 29-page manifesto calling for a complete
revision of the court's voting rights jurisprudence and the elimination
of all forms of race-based districting.' 0
When Shaw was decided, it was perhaps possible to believe that
the case was an anomaly, its significance limited to truly awkward dis-
tricts, and that it would have no serious impact on race-based district-
ing.11 But with the addition of the Holder and De Grandy decisions, it
racial discrimination in North Carolina. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
On June 29, 1995, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in the appeal from this
decision. 115 S. Ct. 2639 (1995).
5. 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
6. Id. at 2659-60.
7. Kennedy warns:
As a general matter, the sorting of persons with an intent to divide by reason of
race raises the most serious constitutional questions .... Given our decision in
Shaw, there is good reason for state and federal officials with responsibilities re-
lated to redistricting, as well as reviewing courts, to recognize that explicit race-
based districting embarks us on a most dangerous course. It is necessary to bear
in mind that redistricting must comply with the overriding demands of the Equal
Protection Clause.
De Grandy, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 2666-67. Kennedy stopped short in his constitutional analysis
in De Grandy because "no constitutional claims were brought here, and the Court's opin-
ion does not address any constitutional issues." Id. at 2667.
8. 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994).
9. Id. at 2588.
10. Id. at 2591-2619.
11. For example, Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi argued that "Shaw is best read as
an exceptional doctrine for aberrational contexts rather than as a prelude to a sweeping
constitutional condemnation of race-conscious redistricting." Richard H. Pildes & Richard
G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-
District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483, 495 (1993). Of course,
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is now clear that this triumvirate is the beginning of a wholesale re-
examination of race-based districting, with tremendous significance
for the future of voting rights and minority representation. Indeed,
these cases may well sound the death knell for race-based districting.12
In its haste to re-examine race-based districting, however, the
Court has overlooked the serious problems with so-called race-neutral
districting that were manifest in the 1960s and 1970s, and to which
race-based districting responded. As the pendulum begins to swing
back, there is a real danger that the Court will forget the lessons of the
1960s and 1970s as it attempts to address the problems of the 1990s. A
thorough examination of both race-based and race-neutral districting,
however, reveals that neither one satisfactorily addresses the
problems of minority representation. Although commentators have
noted the inadequacy of both race-based and race-neutral district-
ing,13 voting rights advocates have continued to focus on race-based
districting as a solution that, while not perfect, is at least readily
achievable. 14
As the Supreme Court threatens to curtail, or put an end to, race-
based districting, however, it becomes important to shift focus. To do
so, however, requires an understanding of what achieving minority
Pildes and Niemi were writing before Holder and De Grandy were decided, and their view
was not unreasonable under the circumstances at the time.
12. The court's recent decision in Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995), confirms
that Shaw's reach is not limited to bizarrely-shaped districts. Rather, the court held in
Miller that a district need not be "bizarre on its face before there is a constitutional viola-
tion." 115 S. Ct. at 2486.
13. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up". Minority Political Participation
and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 449 (1988) (arguing that section 2
of Voting Rights Act could and should be used to produce participational, as well as repre-
sentational, benefits for minority voters); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The
Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MiCH. L. REv. 1077 (1991).
(arguing that proportionate interest representation does not address all defects in black
electoral success theory); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geo-
graphic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 173(1989) (calling on courts to be creative in developing theories of liability under Voting
Rights Act that recoguize that minority vote dilution is not always simply a product of at-
large as opposed to district-based elections).
14. For example, following the 1990 census, voting-rights advocates in Georgia fo-
cused their efforts on obtaining as many "minority-majority" districts as possible in the
ensuing reapportionment. See Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994). Simi-
larly, the Florida plaintiffs in Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647,2652-53 (1994), sought
to maximize the number of districts they controlled, as did the plaintiffs in Holder, 114 S.
Ct. 2581, 2584-85, who were seeking to expand the number of county commissioners so
that, with appropriate districting, African-American voters could control one seat. See also
Guinier, supra note 13, at 1093-99 (describing the evolution in strategy among voting-rights
advocates).
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representation means, and an understanding of the different concep-
tions of representation that have served as the basis for race-neutral
and race-based districting. It is also necessary to understand the para-
dox of districting, what I call the "districting conundrum," that makes
race-based districting both necessary and impractical. Armed with
this understanding, we can map out a new strategy for achieving mi-
nority-and majority-representation in a world where the option of
race-based districting is rapidly disappearing.
In this Article, I will attempt to revisit and reconceptualize the
Court's voting rights jurisprudence in terms of the districting conun-
drum and theories of representation. In Part I, I will define the dis-
tricting conundrum which I believe underlies all districting questions.
In Part II, I will analyze the meaning of representation, focusing on
the individual or "race-neutral" approach to representation and its
limitations. In Part III, I will trace the emergence of a communal, or
race-based, approach to representation in the Supreme Court's voting
rights jurisprudence and in the Voting Rights Act. I will also discuss
the problems of communal representation that have emerged since its
adoption. In Part IV, I will examine the Shaw, De Grandy, and
Holder decisions and analyze the Court's attempts to deal with the
problems of communal representation. Additionally, I will take issue
with Justice Thomas's suggestion that the way to deal with these
problems is to return to a pre-1969 vision of representation, and sug-
gest an alternative way out of the Court's current dilemma, through
some form of proportional representation.
I. The Districting Conundrum
A. lime to Turn Back?
In Tony Kushner's Pulitzer Prize-winning play, Angels in
America, Kushner portrays Heaven as deeply reactionary, threatened
by the human tendency to move, change, travel, progress, and imag-
ine. As the title character-an Angel who visits New York-explains,
humanity's relentless motion not only creates tremors in Heaven but
has driven God himself away. The Angel's mission is to find a
prophet who will tell the human race to stop moving forward. Ex-
plaining her mission, she commands, "Tn back. Undo."' 5 Kushner's
message, ultimately, is that no such turning back is possible. Twice he
writes, "The world only spins forward."'1 6 Kushner recognizes, how-
15. KUSHNER, supra note 1, sc. 2.
16. Id.
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ever, that the processes of change and forward movement can be terri-
fying, in part because the destination remains unknown.1 7
Like Kushner's Angel, Justice Clarence Thomas in his concurring
opinion in Holder v. Hall,'8 issues a call to turn back and undo. Urg-
ing the court to reverse 25 years of Voting Rights Act19 jurisprudence,
Thomas exhorts: "In my view, our current practice should not con-
tinue. Not for another Term, not until the next case, not for another
day."'20 Thomas locates the Court's "wrong turn" in the 1969 case Al-
len v. Board of Supervisors,2' and asks the Court to overrule Allen
and all its progeny. 22 Thus Thomas, in my view, aligns himself firmly
with the forces of reaction which, like the Angel in Kushner's play,
find the process of continuing forward too terrifying and instead seek
the comfort of going back.
Although Thomas's reactionary vision in Holder did not com-
mand a majority and, indeed, was shared by only one other Justice, 2
the Holder case, along with De Grandy, 4 decided the same day, and
Shaw,-5 decided the previous Term, is nonetheless a watershed in Vot-
ing Rights Act jurisprudence. Together, these cases reveal a Court
that is increasingly uncomfortable with its voting rights decisions. Un-
nerved by the prospect that expanded application of the Voting Rights
Act would lead to "political apartheid" 26 and the "racial balkanization
of the Nation," 27 the Court seems poised to retreat to a considerably
weaker vision of racial equality in voting, and possibly even to declare
substantial portions of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional. As
Shaw, Holder, and De Grandy demonstrate, moving forward would
force the Court, and the nation, to confront fundamental questions
17. As the World's Oldest Living Bolshevik puts it in the Prologue to Perestroika, "If
the snake sheds his skin before a new skin is ready, naked he will be in the world, prey to
the forces of chaos. Without his skin he will be dismantled, lose coherence and die. Have
you, my little serpents, a new skin... ? Then we dare not, we canno4 we MUST NOT
move ahead!" Id. at act 1, sc. 1.
18. 114 S. Ct. at 2591.
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973aa-6 (1994).
20. 114 S. Ct. at 2618.
21. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
22. 114 S. Ct. at 2593-97.
23. Only Justice Scalia joined in Thomas's concurrence. In two separate opinions,
Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, and O'Connor reached the same result in the case, but none
of these three Justices adopted Thomas's reasoning, nor did they seek, as does Thomas, to
reverse virtually every Voting Rights Act case since 1969.
24. 114 S. Ct. at 2647.
25. 113 S. Ct. at 2816.
26. Id. at 2827.
27. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2592 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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about voting rights and representation, as well as racial and ethnic
divisions. Moreover, confronting these questions might force the
Court to entertain new solutions, with unknown consequences. The
inclination to "turn back" in order to avoid these difficult questions is
thus understandable. But once asked, these questions about voting
and representation cannot be so easily avoided. Reversing twenty-
five years of case law will not eradicate the underlying issues that have
led us to this point.
The simplest way to avoid dealing with a question is to ignore it,
or to fail to recognize it. To understand what is at stake in the Shaw,
De Grandy, and Holder cases, it is helpful to articulate clearly what
questions these decisions implicate. Only if we know what questions
we are trying to answer can we assess the opinions in these cases.
B. Voting Strength
The fundamental issue underlying the voting rights cases is: How
should representation be allocated? This turns out not to be one
question, but rather a series of related questions that I call the district-
ing conundrum, which can be illustrated with the following
hypothetical.
Suppose there is a jurisdiction with a total population of one mil-
lion voters, 70% of whom are white and 30% of whom are African-
American. Suppose further that these one million voters are to
choose ten representatives, and that they do so in single-member dis-
tricts, each of which consists of 100,000 voters. As a matter of mathe-
matics, the districts can be arranged so that African-Americans are in
the majority, and thus are able to decide the outcome, in zero, one,
two, three, four, or five districts.28 African-Americans will be a major-
ity in zero districts if every district, like the jurisdiction as a whole, is
70% white and 30% African-American; in one district if that district is
25% white and 75% African-American, with the other nine districts
75% white and 25% African-American; in two districts if those two
28. We could just as easily say that the districts can be arranged so that whites are in
the majority, and thus are able to decide the outcome, in 5, 6,7, 8, 9, or 10 districts. In fact,
this latter formulation has the virtue of clarifying that this is not simply a problem of mi-
nority representation. The formulation in the text, written as it is from the point of view of
the white majority, may carry with it an implicit assumption, which I do not intend, that it
is the prerogative of the majority to decide how much representation it will "give" to the
minority. Because, however, most of the districting cases speak in terms of the number of
"majority-minority" districts to be created, rather than the number of "majority-majority"
districts, I will continue to frame the question in terms of the number of districts controlled
by the minority.
1462 [Vol. 46
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are each 46% white and 54% African-American, with the remaining
eight districts each 76% white and 24% African-American; in three
districts each of which is 21% white and 79% African-American, with
the remaining seven districts 91% white and 9% African-American; in
four districts if each of those four is 35.5% white and 64.5% African-
American, with the remaining six districts 93% white and 7% African-
American; and in five districts if half the districts are split 49% white
and 51% African-American, with the remaining half 91% white and
9% African-American. In each example, there are a total of 700,000
white voters and a total of 300,000 black voters. These outcomes are
displayed in Table 1.29
One set of questions arises immediately: Which is the correct re-
sult? Does it make a difference how the result was reached? Most
important, does the Fifteenth Amendment or the Voting Rights Act
have anything to say about these questions?30
However, there is a second, more fundamental set of questions
that must also be addressed. Should we even concern ourselves with
the results of the districting conundrum? Do these results mean any-
thing, and should we-should courts, legislatures, the Justice Depart-
ment, or society as a whole-try to control the outcome?
With respect to the first set of questions, it is useful to define
some terminology describing some of the possible results of the dis-
tricting conundrum. As shown on the chart, in the circumstance I
have described, the minority could, in theory, control one, two, three,
four, or five seats. Five is the maximum number of seats that the mi-
nority can control here. In a winner-take-all election, it requires
50,001 votes to control a seat. Controlling five seats requires a total of
250,005 votes-50,001 in each of five districts. With a total minority
population of 300,000, there are more than enough votes to meet this
requirement. Controlling six seats would require 6 times 50,001 or
300,006 votes-six more than the total minority population in the en-
tire jurisdiction.
29. See DOUGLAS AMY, REAL CHOICES, NEW VoICEs 40 (1993). I have based my
figures on Professor Amy's chart showing possible allocation of seats between Democrats
and Republicans when Democrats are 58% of the population and Republicans 42%. Be-
cause racial minorities are generally a smaller minority than the Democrat-Republican
split hypothesized, I have adjusted the numbers, and at the same have carried the analysis
further to show that every number of seats from 0 to 5 is a possible outcome.
30. The problem shows many variations: What if there are three groups, not two?
See Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (199.4). What if there are no districts at all? See
Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994). What if the voting is at large? Although each
variation poses distinctive questions, an overall theory of how to approach the basic prob-
lem would go a long way to solving the special problems that arise in particular cases.
J'uly 19951
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In any districting problem, the maximum number of seats that
any group can control can be calculated by taking the whole number
portion of the result of dividing the total population of that group in
the jurisdiction as a whole (P), by half the number of voters (V) in
each district plus one: P Here, 300,000 = 5 with a remainder of
'1 V+l" 50,000+1
49,995, indicating that five is the maximum number of seats that can
be controlled by this group. The formula also tells us that the majority
has more than enough votes to control all ten seats, and indeed, could
control up to thirteen: 700,000 = 13 with a remainder of 49,987.50,000+1
The result of this formula for any group, whether in the majority
or in the minority, yields maximum representation. Thus, when we
speak of districting with a goal of maximization, we are speaking of
districting to achieve the most number of seats possible, as calculated
by this formula.31
We may also district so that the proportion of seats held by a
particular group matches the proportion of the population comprised
by that group. In Table 1, this would be the result found in Example
D, where African-Americans are assumed to be 30% of the
population and hold 30% of the seats. This situation can be described
mathematically as follows: St= Gwhere Sg is the number of seats held
~St T
by the group, St is the total number of seats, G is the number of
members in the group and T is the total population of the jurisdiction.
This result is sometimes referred to as "proportional representation,"
but that is a misnomer. As I shall discuss below, proportional
representation historically has referred to systems of voting in which
representation is proportional to the way the ballots have actually
been cast-that is, to systems that are not "winner-take-all" elections.
This is altogether different from choosing the result from Table 1 that
matches demographic proportions. For this reason, I shall use the
term "proportional representation" in its historic sense and refer to
31. It is also possible to define a formula for minimization-that is, a formula showing
the minimum number of seats that a group can control. This formula would be S- T-7
• V+1
where S is the total number of seats available, T is the total population in the jurisdiction,
P is the population of the group in question, and V is the number of voters in each district
and the fraction is understood to refer to the whole number portion of the quotient only.
This would confirm that the 700,000-member majority will have at least 5 seats no matter
how we district, because (1,000,000- 700,000) + 50,001 yields a whole number portion of 5,
and 10, the total number of seats available, minus 5 = 5. Districting specifically designed to
minimize representation, however, would seem problematic and it is unlikely that one
would see that expressed as the stated goal.
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the result shown in Example D and represented by the above formula
as "demographic proportionality."
I wish to turn now to the second set of questions posed by the
districting conundrum-those that ask whether we ought to attempt
to answer the conundrum at all. Because I find these questions to be
so significant, I want to be clear about what they mean. What does it
mean to say that we are concerned about the districting conundrum?
Addressing or accepting the districting conundrum requires that we
approach representation in a planned and centralized way-that
someone decide how much representation a group ought to have.
Such an approach is substantive and result-oriented: legislatures and
courts should judge the fairness of a districting process by the result it
produces. Not caring about or rejecting the districting conundrum
means adopting a procedural approach to districting, with a laissez-
faire approach to the consequences of districting. It means that
legislatures and courts make no effort to control a group's
representation, which eliminates the burden of deciding how much
representation each group ought to have. It means that we judge the
fairness of the districting process not by the results, but rather by the
rules which govern the process.
Addressing the districting conundrum corresponds to the use of
"race-based" districting, districting drawn to produce (or to avoid) a
particular outcome to the districting conundrum.32 Rejecting the
districting conundrum, on the other hand, corresponds to "race-
neutral" districting, which I shall use to refer to districting that is not
evaluated with reference to its ability to produce (or avoid) any
particular result, but only with reference to whether the process used
is believed to be "fair."
It might be argued that "race-neutral" districting is any districting
that was not drawn with the intention of producing a particular result
to the districting conundrum, but I believe that such a definition
would not capture the essence of the conundrum. The conundrum is
about how we evaluate districting, not about how we draw it. At the
heart of the districting conundrum is the realization that any
districting plan, no matter how it was drawn or what was intended,
will produce one of the results on a chart like Table 1. This insight
forces us to decide whether we will look at this effect. The use of the
term "race-neutral" districting to refer to districting drawn without
32. It is necessary to emphasize the phrase "or avoid" in this formulation, in order to
recognize that a plan drawn to ensure that the answer is not zero is still a race-based plan,
even if no particular answer other than "not zero" is chosen.
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racial animus obscures this question by focusing on the mental state of
the drafter and the process used, rather than on the choice a court or
legislator must make about whether to look beyond that process to
the actual effect of the plan. Thus, the critical feature of a "race-
neutral" scheme is not what the individual who drew it had in mind,
but rather whether we will choose to examine the results that have
been achieved from a race-based orientation, or whether we will limit
our examination to an evaluation of the process.
I believe that Shaw, Holder, and De Grandy can best be
understood as attempts to grapple with one aspect or another of this
problem. An examination of these cases confirms that the two sets of
inquiries I have outlined-should we address the districting
conundrum, and if we do, what is the correct answer to it-are the
central issues confronting the Court.
Of course, these issues do not arise in a vacuum. The Fifteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Voting Rights Act
provide the basic sources of law against which these questions are
measured. The Fifteenth Amendment provides: "The right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." 33 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (the
"Act") provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color ....(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if,
based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election.., are not equally open
to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by sub-
section (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to
which members of a protected class have been elected to office...
is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That noth-
ing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected
class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.3 4
Section 5 of the Act requires certain covered jurisdictions to ob-
tain preclearance of changes to "any voting qualification or prerequi-
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. The protections of the Voting Rights Act are extended to lan-
guage minorities by 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (1994).
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site to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to
voting" to ensure that "such qualification, prerequisite, standard,
practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color."
35
Districting has been recognized as a "standard, practice or proce-
dure" within the meaning of the Voting Rights Act.36 Accordingly,
the Justice Department and the courts have required states and their
subdivisions to draw their districts in a way that does not violate the
Act, and that does not abridge voting rights within the meaning of the
Fifteenth Amendment. One mechanism that has been used to ensure
that minority vote is not abridged is the "majority-minority" district-
an electoral district in which members of a minority group are in the
majority, and thus have the opportunity to elect a representative of
their choice.
In applying the Voting Rights Act, the courts speak of "voting
strength," and look to be sure that districting schemes are not "dilu-
tive" of African-American voting strength. It is useful to note at this
point that "voting strength" corresponds to the allocation of represen-
tation in the districting conundrum. Once we begin to focus on the
voting strength of a particular group, we have entered into the district-
ing conundrum-we have begun to ask how many seats the group
should control.37 The Supreme Court first adopted this concept of
voting strength in 1969 in Allen v. Board of Elections. 38 Allen thus
does represent a turning point in the Court's jurisprudence, in that
Allen was the point at which the Court first turned from a position of
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
36. See, e.g., Allen v. Board of Supervisors, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (applying the
Voting Rights Act to change from single-member to multimember districts); 28 C.F.R.
§ 51.13 (1994) (subjecting redistricting to § 5 preclearance).
37. Other commentators have pointed out that the concept of vote dilution employed
in Allen requires some notion of what the "proper" voting strength of a group "ought" to
be-that is, how many seats "ought" a group to control? See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 13,
at 518 (discussing "baseline" standard); Karlan, supra note 13, at 232 (discussing cumula-
tive voting); see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 88 (1986) (noting that term "vote
dilution" suggests a norm against which to weigh whether dilution has occurred). Indeed,
this insight forms the basis for Justice Kennedy's and Justice O'Connor's opinions in
Holder, and it is not my purpose to suggest that they were wrong in this regard. Nonethe-
less, even commentary that recognizes this problem has tended to gloss over its implica-
tions. Thus, while they recognize the importance to vote-dilution analysis of the question
raised by the districting conundrum, neither Professor Karlan nor Professor Abrams ad-
dress whether that question can be answered or how we would go about deciding what the
answer should be.
38. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
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ignoring the districting conundrum to a position of recognizing and
attempting to answer it.
Shaw, De Grandy, and Holder all show the Court increasingly
uncomfortable with its efforts since Allen to address the districting co-
nundrum. The Shaw case is nothing more than a rephrasing of the
basic districting conundrum: Should we care-and therefore try to de-
termine-how many districts are controlled by minority voters, even if
it makes our districts look funny? Holder raises another variation of
the districting conundrum, one that asks: If answering the districting
conundrum is too hard, should we rethink the question of addressing
the conundrum in the first place? De Grandy also asks a slightly dif-
ferent question of the districting conundrum: If we accept that the
districting conundrum matters, what is the correct answer?
I will postpone full discussion of these cases until Part IV, but it is
important to note that in each of these cases, at least some of the
justices show themselves inclined to abandon the districting conun-
drum. Some of the justices seems to want to abandon it on principle,
while others seem ready to abandon it because of the difficulty of an-
swering it in the variety of situations in which it has begun to arise.
Rejecting the districting conundrum and limiting the Voting Rights
Act to questions of ballot access and counting, as Justice Thomas sug-
gests,39 would, however, permit the most blatant types of racist manip-
ulation. For if courts adopt the view that the results of the districting
conundrum-how many seats should the minority get-do not matter,
there is no reason to believe that local authorities will similarly turn a
blind eye to this question. If we cannot examine the results of the
districting conundrum, there is nothing to stop our hypothetical juris-
diction from changing its voting system, abandoning district voting al-
together in favor of at-large voting for all ten seats, which would
insure that the number of seats chosen by members of the minority
group is zero.40 Under Thomas's interpretation of the Voting Rights
Act, this would be permissible even if local officials in our hypotheti-
cal jurisdiction made this change for the sole purpose of ensuring that
minority voters would have no say in the election.41
39. Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2618 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
40. This was precisely the change at issue in the Allen case, and it was to deal with this
kind of manipulation that the Court turned toward a recognition of race-based districting
in the first place.
41. Although it might seem that a discriminatory motive itself should be sufficient to
invalidate such a districting plan, I am not at all sure that would be the case. The problem
would be that without a theory of the proper voting strength of the group in question, it
could be argued that the discriminatory motive had in fact caused no harm. That is, if
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Thus, if race-based districting leads to "political apartheid" and
"balkanization," so-called "race-neutral" districting can lead to delib-
erate racist exclusion or, at the very least, to unintentional, but un-
challengeable, exclusion and frustration.
Unfortunately, the Court is not entirely wrong in identifying
problems that arise once we actually attempt the answer the conun-
drum. I believe that we can neither ignore the districting conundrum
nor answer it. This may seem paradoxical, in view of my contention
that ignoring the districting conundrum or answering it are the only
two possible responses. Nonetheless, I believe that the history of vot-
ing rights cases leading up to Allen demonstrates why we cannot ig-
nore the districting conundrum, while an examination of the cases
since Allen illustrates why we cannot answer it either. Confronted
with this paradox, we need to find another way around the districting
conundrum.
11. Representation
A. The Meaning of Representation
The districting conundrum is about how representatives are to be
chosen. To determine whether we should care how many seats a par-
ticular group can control, we need to understand who, or what, is be-
ing represented. Put another way, What is the unit of representation?
By "unit of representation," I mean whatever entity we conceive of to
be the represented party. The unit of representation tells us on whose
behalf the representative speaks. If we understand who or what is
being represented, then the question how, and by whom, representa-
tives are to be chosen may become clearer.
Much of the scholarship about representation has focused on
what a representative does and what it means to be a representative.
there is no right to elect any particular number of representatives, then it becomes difficult
to articulate how any districting scheme, no matter what the subjective intent of those who
drew it, has abridged anyone's right to vote. That is certainly what Justice Thomas argues
in Holder and it does appear to be a logical extension of so-called race-neutral districting.
On the other hand, the intention to divide people along racial lines was sufficient to
bring the districting in Shaw under the scrutiny of the Court. In addition, in City of Rich-
mond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975), the Court held that an annexation that did not,
in fact, have an adverse effect on minority voting rights might still be reversed if it were
enacted solely for a discriminatory motive. It should be noted, however, the discriminatory
motive in City of Richmond failed to produce a discriminatory result because the electoral
structure in fact gave sufficient voting strength to the black community, not because it
sought to deprive African-Americans of something to which they had no right in the first
place. Whether motive without harm would be sufficient in the latter circumstance is
unclear.
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In The Concept of Representation,4 2 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin analyzes
what has been written about representation in order to come to an
understanding of what it means. She identifies different conceptions
of representation, including authorization, 43 accountability,44 "stand-
ing for" representation,45 and "acting for" representation.46 In doing
so, however, Pitkin is interested in one particular set of questions. She
argues that representation rests on a fundamental paradox, the notion
that "something not literally present is considered as present in a non-
literal sense."47 For Pitkin, then, the interesting questions about rep-
resentation are "in what" sense and "from whose perspective is
representation to be considered?" 48 Moreover, Pitkin argues that
these questions cannot be answered simply by looking at whether peo-
ple feel themselves to be represented, but in terms of "when should
men feel that they are represented" and "what would count as evi-
dence that they are represented?" 49 In essence, Pitkin turns to vari-
ous theories about how representatives ought to behave in order to
determine when people should feel represented.
In viewing theories of representation through this particular lens,
however, Pitkin and her predecessors have bypassed an issue that is
perhaps more fundamental, namely, the question of who or what is
represented in the first place. In asking "when should men feel that
42. HANNA FENICHEL PrTEN, THE CONCEPT OF REPP.ESENTATION (1967).
43. According to Pitkin, "the basic features of the authorization view are these: a
representative is someone who has been authorized to act. This means that he has been
given a right to act which he did not have before, while the represented becomes responsi-
ble for the consequences of that action as if he had done it himself." Id. at 38-39.
44. Pitkin describes the accountability theory of representation as one in which "a
representative is someone who is to be held to account, who will have to answer to another
for what he does. The man or men to whom he must eventually account are those whom
he represents." Id. at 55. Thus, what makes someone a representative in this view is that
she is "subject to reelection or removal at the end of her term," when she must account for
what she has done. Id. at 56.
45. Pitkin defines two kinds of "standing for" representation. A descriptive notion of
"standing for" representation refers to a notion of representation in which representation
depends on "the representative's characteristics, on what he is or is like, on being some-
thing rather than doing something. The representative does not act for others; he 'stands
for' them, by virtue of correspondence or connection between them, a resemblance or
reflection." Id. at 61. A symbolic kind of "standing for" representation, however, involves
a representative whose connection to that which she stands for is symbolic; she does not
resemble what she stands for, she symbolizes it. IAL at 92-93.
46. An "acting for" theory of representation is a theory about a representative's ac-
tions for, in behalf of, in the interest of, others. This view looks at what the representative
actually does, whose benefits she promotes. Id. at 113-16.
47. Id. at 9.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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they are represented," we have already assumed that it is "men"-
that is, individuals-that ought to feel this way.50
But that need not be so. In theory, the unit of representation
could be many other things besides the individual. 51 In some situa-
tions-a religious or educational context, perhaps-we might choose
representation by family; in a corporation, the unit of representation
is the share; a state or county commission might look for input from a
representative of each town;52 in a university, we might expect to see
each department, or each school, represented, 53 just as a larger educa-
tional organization might act through a representative from each
school or university.5 4 A coalition of organizations may include a rep-
resentative from each organization. An entire nation can be the rep-
resented unit, whether in the United Nations or at a meeting of the G-
7.
50. Indeed, Pitkin seems to assume that the answer to her question "when ought men
to feel represented" turns primarily, if not solely, on the conduct of the representative-
whether the representative acts pursuant to authority, is accountable, is similar or symbolic
enough to stand for, or acts for the represented. What I propose here is to shift the focus
from the representative to the represented, and then to ask how the represented ought to
choose their representative.
51. Theories of representation have changed over time. In its earliest form, the mem-
bership of the English Parliament "was one of representatives of classes," or Estates. See
ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF LAWMAKING BY
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 73 (Da Capo Press Reprint Edition 1971) (1930). The
Estates General in France, too, consisted of representatives of the three estates recognized
in society, the clergy, the nobility, and the common people. Id. at 60. Such representatives
represented not individual people, but a particular class of persons. Later, representation
in England was by shire or town, that is, it was the town or shire (rather than the individu-
als who resided there) that was actually represented in Parliament. Id. at 64, 72. Indeed,
according to Luce, the term "Commons" originated as an abbreviation of the Latin "com-
munitatas" or "communities." Id. at 76.
Similarly, in Massachusetts, beginning in the 17th century and continuing until the
middle of the 19th century, the town, as a corporate body, was the unit of representation in
the legislature or General Court. See J.R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 33-54 (1966). Gradually, however, in
America, the notion of a town or county or other community as the unit of representation
gave way to the idea of the individual as the unit of representation. The constituency of a
congressman or state legislator is no longer conceived to be a town, a county or a state as a
corporate body, but rather the individuals who reside in that representative's district. In
the legislative body, the representative speaks for and represents those individuals, and
not some other corporate entity.
52. See Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971) (considering constitutionality of county
reapportionment scheme).
53. Thus, we would not be surprised to find a university-wide body consisting of rep-
resentatives from each school in the university.
54. Each member law school, for example, sends a delegate to meetings of the Associ-
ation of American Law Schools.
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Indeed, the individual is not the only unit of representation that
has been recognized in this country. The U.S. Senate, where repre-
sentation is by state, is perhaps the most famous example. Prior to the
mid-1960s, representation on a county basis within state legislatures
was widespread,55 and as recently as 1983 the Supreme Court upheld
county-based representation in Wyoming despite great divergences in
population.56 Towns, as political subdivisions within counties, have
also provided a basis for representation.5 7 Representation based on
land ownership and apportioned according to the number of acres
owned has also been upheld.58 More recently, the Supreme Court has
adopted, at least in part, the notion that racial and language groups,
can sometimes be the unit of representation.59
To address questions of districting and allocation of representa-
tion, we must have a clear idea of who or what it is we believe ought
to be represented. We are not going to be able to agree on how many
delegates each country will send to the United Nations, for example,
without addressing the question of the unit of representation. So long
as one country believes that the unit ought to be the individual (or the
province, etc.) and others believe that the unit ought to be the nation,
we are not going to be able to allocate representation in a systematic
way. The same is true for legislative districting-without a clear sense
of who or what is being represented, we will not be able to make co-
herent choices about how that representation should be allocated.
Once we recognize that the unit of representation is not necessar-
ily a foregone conclusion, it becomes clear that Pitkin's question-
when ought men to feel represented-is inadequate. Instead, we
should ask: Who or what is represented, and who or what ought to be
55. The opinions in both Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims document this wide-
spread use of representation by county in effect at the time these cases were decided. See
Baker, 369 U.S. 186, 189 n.4 (1962); Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983). The Court in Brown found that the
deviation from "one person, one vote" principles, which it recognized was not minor, was
justified by Wyoming's long-standing and good-faith commitment to preserving the integ-
rity of its political subdivisions.
57. See Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1970) (deviations from "one person, one vote"
were acceptable when state sought to preserve the integrity of towns, which for more than
a century had been the basis for representation in county government).
58. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981). The voting scheme was upheld because the
water reclamation district board so elected did not exercise sufficient governmental powers
to require compliance with "one person, one vote." Ball thus confirms that the appropri-
ateness of any particular unit of representation turns on the particular circumstances and
the body in which representation is being sought.
59. Allen, Gingles, and De Grandy are all examples of this. See infra Parts III and
IV.C.
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represented? Is the unit of representation appropriate to the circum-
stances, and what are the consequences of using that level of represen-
tation, rather than another one?60 Does the unit of representation we
have chosen correspond to the way we think and behave?
We need not, however, start from scratch here. Modem Ameri-
can case law recognizes two main approaches to the question of the
unit of representation:61 the individual approach, using the individual
as the basic unit of representation,62 and the communal approach, us-
ing a racial or ethnic group as the unit of representation. 63
Moreover, there is a correspondence between these approaches
to representation and the districting conundrum. The individual the-
ory of representation corresponds to the position that the districting
conundrum doesn't matter. After all, the districting conundrum asks
how much representation shall be allocated to a group. If individuals,
not groups, are what is represented, then this question will not be a
meaningful one. We shouldn't care whether African-Americans are in
the majority in zero, one, two, three, four, or five districts if African-
Americans, or whites, for that matter, are not a relevant category.
Similarly, a group theory of representation corresponds to the notion
that we should address the districting conundrum. If representation
60. Obviously, traditional representation theories address these questions in another
form. For clearly one can ask whether individuals ought to feel represented through the
mediating structure of the nation. I believe, however, that by asking the question in this
way, the fundamental choice of the basis of representation is obscured.
61. Although representation has traditionally been allocated geographically, I argue,
infra, that geographic representation, at least in modem times, is nothing more than a
method for implementing individual representation. It is true that at one time geographi-
cally-cohesive communities formed the unit of representation, but I believe that this type
of representation is best understood as representation by community, rather than a purely
geographic representation. See J.R. POLE, supra note 51, at 172-249. Indeed, as Pole notes,
when geographic lines were first substituted for county representation in Massachusetts in
the 19th century by Elbridge Gerry, voters were offended at the separation of representa-
tion from community and called his districting a "gerrymander." Id. at 247. This suggests
that geography alone did not then correspond to any genuine sense of representation, nor,
I would argue, does it today. That is, despite a widespread and strongly-felt adherence to a
geographic system of allocating individual representation, I do not believe that voters form
any identification with their voting district and do not think of themselves as being repre-
sented in their capacity as members of such district. Indeed, the ease with which individu-
als are moved from one district to another with a stroke of the pen further indicates that
these geographic districts do not correspond to anything fundamental about the voter.
62. The individual approach is embodied in such cases as Baker v. Carr, Reynolds v.
Sims, and Whitcomb v. Chavis, see infra notes 64-76, 100-08 and accompanying text, as well
as in Justice Thomas's concurrence in Holder.
63. The communal approach is embodied in such cases as Allen, and Gingles and De
Grandy. See infra notes 90-108, 133-35, 179-86 and accompanying text.
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occurs at the group level, if a group is the unit of representation, then
we must ask how much representation that group ought to have.
As we trace the Court's use of these different theories of repre-
sentation, then, it is useful to remember that all these decisions repre-
sent reactions to the districting conundrum. Moreover, the Court's
experience with individual representation demonstrates that we can-
not ignore the districting conundrum, just as the Court's experience
with group representation shows us that we cannot answer the district-
ing conundrum.
B. The Individual as The Unit of Representation
Although the notion of the individual as the unit of representa-
tion has been around for quite some time,64 its ascendancy as the pri-
mary or sole basis for representation was both recent and short-lived.
Until the 1960s, notions of individually-based representation coexisted
with older notions in such a way as to prevent the implementation of a
truly individual representation. When individual representation was
finally implemented, it was quickly seen to be inadequate and almost
immediately supplemented with a communal vision of representation.
A fully individual notion of representation in a representative de-
mocracy depends on two corollary principles. The first principle is
that every individual must have the opportunity to vote-that is, uni-
versal suffrage is a logical corollary to representation on an individual
basis. The second proposition is that each person's vote is equal to
every other person's-the principle of one person, one vote. This,
too, is a logical corollary of the individual theory of representation.
(1) One Person, One Vote
The principle of "one person, one vote" follows directly from the
notion that the individual-the "person" referred to in the slogan-is
the unit of representation. Equality of representation, a basic princi-
ple of democracy, requires equality at the level of whatever the unit of
representation. If the unit of representation, for example, is the town
or the state, then equality of representation will require that each
town or each state have the same number of representatives. 65 Taking
64. See supra note 51.
65. Using once again the analogy of the United Nations, no one has proposed-or at
least, no one has seriously entertained-basing representation in the United Nations on
the population of the constituent countries. The point is that we take for granted that the
unit of representation in the United Nations is the nation-state, and we find no inequality
in giving nations of vastly different populations the same representation.
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into account the relative populations of the units will, on such a view,
be seen as unequal representation.66 "One town, one vote" is as per-
suasive a slogan as "one person, one vote," if you understand the town
to be the basic unit of representation. Once you recognize the individ-
ual as the basic unit of representation however, fairness and equality
will require that each individual be represented equally-that is, one
person, one vote.
Prior to 1962, however, the Supreme Court had never required
that representation be apportioned on an equal basis. Between 1962
and 1964, in the line of cases beginning with Baker v. Car 67 and end-
ing with Reynolds v. Sims, 68 the Court recognized that the right to
vote can be denied by dilution of voting power as well as by an abso-
lute prohibition on casting a ballot.69 In Reynolds, the Court recog-
nized that if one representative represents ten individuals and another
represents twenty individuals, then the twenty constituents in the sec-
ond group have half a vote compared to the ten in the first group; the
Court found this to be a violation of equal protection. 70
Prior to 1962, then, the individual was not fully recognized to be
the basic unit of representation, because it was not considered neces-
sary that each individual be equally represented. But even after the
Court's recognition of the principle of "one person, one vote," the
individual theory of representation was still not fully realized, because
not all individuals were permitted to vote.
(2) Universal suffrage
When a class, an organization, or a town is being represented,
universal individual suffrage is not logically necessary for democracy.
66. See POLE, supra note 51, at 203.
67. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Baker recognized the justiciability of challenges to appor-
tionment on the grounds of vote dilution.
68. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
69. "[Tlhe right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight
of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise." Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555.
70. This principle seems so obvious that it often seems surprising that it took the
Court nearly 100 years after the principle of equal protection was formally adopted to
recognize it. The explanation for this lies, I think, in the remnants of corporate notions of
representation. Towns and counties continued to remain the basic unit of representation in
at least a part of state government long after the notion of the individual had emerged. By
1964, however, corporate bodies were no longer accepted as the basis of representation-
indeed, they had ceased to be the unit of representation even in practice, and were re-
placed, for the most part, by the district. By 1964, it is likely that the Court, and most
Americans, could conceive of no other basis for representation than the individual. At that
point, "one person, one vote" became necessary and obvious.
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Because the group is the entity that is represented, but individuals
who vote, there is no one-to-one correspondence between voting and
representation. One does not acquire representation by voting, but
rather by being a member of a community that is represented. In this
circumstance, it is not necessary that every individual have a voice in
choosing the representatives for the community.71 Some subset of the
group may be perceived to be best situated to decide who will repre-
sent the group as a whole. The nonvoting individuals are no less rep-
resented than the voting ones, because in fact none of the individuals
are represented. Only the community is actually represented. Thus,
the division between voting-which is performed by individuals-and
representation-which takes place at the group level-makes it possi-
ble to have universal representation without universal suffrage.
But once you conceive of the individual as the unit of representa-
tion, universal suffrage becomes inevitable in a democracy. For if it is
the individual, and not some group of which the individual is a part,
that is represented, then the only way to acquire representation is to
vote. Representation means, in this context, that each individual is
sending a deputy, a delegate to speak for her. Others like her may be
represented, but without a mediating concept of a group that is being
represented, there is simply no way to understand the representation
of an individual separate and apart from that individual's participation
in the process of selecting the representative. 72 An individual who is
not permitted to vote is unrepresented in such a system, and in a true
democracy, there can be no logical justification for such an omission.
Nonetheless, for most of the history of this country, African-
Americans and women were denied the right to vote and thus were
denied representation. It took two constitutional amendments to rec-
tify that situation in theory, but even after the constitution was
71. We are not surprised when the President of the United States appoints a represen-
tative to the United Nations. The ambassador so appointed represents the United States
as an entity-it seems unremarkable that the President, as the head of state, should choose
its representative. Thus, we do not demand that our representative to the United Nations
be elected by a popular vote.
72. I do not wish to suggest that it is never possible for someone to choose a represen-
tative for someone else. In this context, however, I believe that it is sufficient to say that
no democratic principle could justify allowing some individuals to choose their own repre-
sentatives, while denying others that privilege, while representation is understood to occur
at the individual level. Of course, even individuals who have the right to vote often choose
not to. I would argue that such individuals are not represented, and that actual participa-
tion in the process of choosing a representative is the only way to acquire representation if
the unit of representation is the individual. But a system that offers representation to
anyone who wants it would still seem to be a representative democracy, even if some indi-
viduals were unrepresented by choice.
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amended to require that every individual be given the right to vote,
African-Americans were routinely denied that right.73 The Voting
Rights Act of 1965 was designed to remedy that situation.
The Act was designed to make the promise of African-American
suffrage real by removing the roadblocks that prevented black Ameri-
cans from registering to vote and casting their ballots.74 The Act in its
original version represents the triumph of the individual notion of rep-
resentation: its fundamental principle is that the unit of representa-
tion is the individual and therefore every individual must be given the
opportunity to participate in the selection of representatives. More-
over, the Voting Rights Act was, by and large, successful in removing
formal barriers to registration and voting.75
Prior to Reynolds and the enforcement of the Voting Rights Act,
it was impossible to say how the individual theory of representation
would work in practice, for in fact it had never been tried. It was only
with the passage of the Act-Reynolds having been decided the year
before-that the notion of the individual as the unit of representative
democratic government could at last be tested. For the first time,
every individual had the right to be represented and every individual
was equally represented. Almost as soon as the individual theory of
representation was fully realized, however, its limitations became
apparent.76
73. The HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITrEE REPORT ON THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT OF
1965, H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2437, 243940, noted: "The history of the 15th amendment litigation in the Supreme Court
reveals both the variety of means used to bar Negro voting and the durability of such
discriminatory policies ... through the 'grandfather clause' cases ... and the 'white pri-
mary' cases ... to racial gerrymandering... to improper challenges ... and, finally, the
discriminatory use of tests .... " The report further documented that "Progress [in elimi-
nating discrimination] has been painfully slow, in part because of the intransigence of State
and local officials," and that "Barring one contrivance too often has caused no change in
result, only in methods." Id at 9-10.
74. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (discussing history of dis-
crimination and Congress' response).
75. See Guinier, supra note 13, at 1092-93.
76. As discussed infra in Part II.C.2, the limitations discussed here result from a larger
incoherence in the individual theory of representation. Thus, although the argument here
focused on the particular issues of racism that arose in the 1960's, I believe that the
problems with individual representation are fundamental and would not be overcome even
if racism could somehow be eliminated.
1478 [Vol. 46
C. The Limitations of Individual Representation
(1) Individual Representation and Racism
The individual theory of representation reached its limits when it
was confronted with racism, a problem it was singularly unable to ad-
dress. Once whites were no longer able to prevent blacks from regis-
tering and casting their votes, they quickly figured out how to nullify
the effect of African-American votes through a variety of other, more
subtle techniques, such as "cracking," 77 "stacking," 78 and the use of at-
large, winner-take-all districts.79 These devices defied analysis under
traditional notions of individual representation.
In the late 1960s, the Court confronted this problem. In 1966,
Virginia and Mississippi made certain amendments to their voting
laws. The amendments were, on their face, color-blind. Moreover,
the amendments did not prevent anyone, black or white, from casting
his or her vote. One of the amendments in Mississippi was to change
the way county board of supervisors was elected. Prior to 1966, each
county in Mississippi was divided into five districts; each district
elected one member of the board.80 In 1966, Mississippi law was
amended to permit counties to elect the entire board of supervisors at
large by all qualified electors of the county. After the amendment was
passed, at least two Mississippi counties chose to switch to an at-large
system of representation.81
Under a purely individual theory of representation, there could
be no problem with such an amendment. Each voter in the county
was permitted to vote; each person's vote carried exactly the same
weight. Of course, the majority would prevail and the minority would
lose, but that is, after all, the way voting works. Because a strictly
individual theory of representation does not recognize group rights to
representation, there could be no way to attack the change in Missis-
77. "Cracking" refers to the practice of dividing minority group members among mul-
tiple districts, in each of which they will be in the minority. Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D.
Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Ger-
rymandering, 9 YALE L. & PoL'y REv. 301, 303-04.
78. "Stacking" refers to the practice of placing all the minority voters into one district
in which minority group members are already a majority, and thus preventing these addi-
tional group members from influencing another election in which they are not already in
the majority. Id. Thus, if African-Americans make up 55% in each of two districts, district
lines would be redrawn so that African-Americans would constitute, say, 80% in one dis-
trict, and 30% in the other, thus reducing the number of seats controlled by blacks from
two to one.
79. See, eg., Allen v. Board of Supervisors, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
80. Id. at 550.
81. Id.
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sippi law; no individual was being denied to right to vote for the candi-
date of his or her choice, and under a strict individual theory of voting,
there is no other unit of representation at which to look.
The problem was that, despite the inability of an individual the-
ory of representation to recognize the defect, it was clear that the
change in Mississippi law would prevent African-Americans, who
might well have comprised a majority in one or more districts while
remaining a minority in the county as a whole, from electing a mem-
ber of the board of supervisors. For while the individual theory of
representation presupposed a world where the individual was the unit
of representation, the voters in Mississippi didn't think in terms of
individuals. They thought in terms of groups-specifically, racial
groups. Although the Constitution and the theory of individual repre-
sentation were blind to divisions of race, American voters and Ameri-
can legislatures were not. The white voters in Mississippi were
content to let African-Americans go to the polls and cast their votes,
so long as the white voters could be sure that the African-Americans
would always be in the minority and therefore unable to elect repre-
sentatives. The individual theory of representation was simply unable
to address the problems of voting in world where voters think in terms
of groups. If the Mississippi amendment and other manipulations like
it were to be struck down, a different theory of representation would
have to used. The Court would have to recognize some kind of group
right before it could find the flaw in the Mississippi statute. In 1969, in
Allen v. State Board of Elections, the Court adopted a communal view
of representation in order to strike down Mississippi's attempt to dis-
enfranchise its black citizens in this way.
Before turning to Allen and the Court's adoption of a communal
view of representation, however, it is worth noting that the flaw in
individual representation that precipitated this shift was not a fluke, or
a result of unusual circumstances, but rather a fundamental problem
with the individual theory of representation.
(2) The Unrepresented Minority
The incoherence of individual representation arises from the par-
adox of having one representative represent many individuals. If rep-
resentation is conceived to occur at the level of a group or other
entity, this phenomenon presents no problem. But if we dispense with
the mediating concept of a group, we run into difficulties with the
problem of having one representative for many people.
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Consider the situation where an entity, a town, for example, is
represented. How is the representative chosen? Each member of the
community may vote on who the representative should be. The ma-
jority will prevail in its choice; the minority will not have its choice of
representative. But the representative chosen in this way represents
the entity-the town-rather than the individuals who comprise it.
Neither the winners nor the losers are personally represented-only
the town has a representative. To the extent that any voter feels her-
self to be a part of the town, she is represented, but only in the sense
that the town's representative speaks for her community. Thus, to the
extent that a dissenting voter who did not vote for this representative
is a member of the entity, she is represented nonetheless. So long as it
is the entity and not the individual that is represented, and so long as
the individual is a member of that entity, then she is represented, even
by the candidate she did not choose. But it is important to note that
this notion turns entirely on the idea that no individuals are actually
understood to be represented. Because it is not the individual who is
represented, there is no difference between an individual who cast her
ballot one way, and one who cast hers the other. Both-and
neither-are represented to the same extent, because their identity as
a party who can be represented is totally subsumed within the town.
Even where the entity, or the group that has voted for a represen-
tative, does not constitute the legal unit of representation, it may still
make sense to speak of each voter, majority or minority, as being rep-
resented by the victor so long as the voters in fact constitute a coher-
ent group. That is, to the extent that the dissenting voter identifies
with the group of voters and feels herself to be part of this group, as
opposed to other, random groupings of voters, she may still feel her-
self to be represented by someone she personally opposes. This is be-
cause the representative speaks for her community and even if the
representative does not speak for her personally, to the extent that
she identifies herself as a part of the community, she is represented
because the community is represented. But in this context, represen-
tation still occurs on a group basis. The individual is not actually the
unit of representation-once again, it is the group of which the indi-
vidual feels herself to be a part.
The concept of "virtual representation" is a variation on this ap-
proach. "Virtual representation" refers to the notion that even if one
did not choose one's own representative, someone else, perhaps the
representative of another district, provides "virtual representation,"
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by advancing one's interests and points of view.82 Thus, the theory
goes, a minority voter, though outnumbered in her district, may be
"virtually" represented by a member of her group elected from an-
other district.
The problem with "virtual representation," however is that it cre-
ates two classes of voters-those who actually choose their represen-
tative and those who do not actually choose, but whose interests are
deemed by someone else to be adequately accounted for. It is difficult
to see how such a distinction can be justified. If it is important for
some voters to choose their own representative, why is not important
for all?
More important, the concept of "virtual representation" most
often depends on an "essentialist" philosophy. 83 What allows us to
decide that an African-American in District A is "virtually repre-
sented" by the representative of District B, who was chosen by a ma-
jority of African-American voters, is the intermediate notion that
what is essential about the voter is her race, and that any group of
African-Americans can substitute for her in choosing her representa-
tive, because they are essentially the same. Thus, once again, it is the
mediating concept of a group, this time a racial group, that gives
meaning to the notion of "virtual representation." The individual is
represented only insofar as she is understood to be a part of the racial
group, so that she can be virtually represented by the representatives
of that group.
When one representative purports to represent multiple individu-
als who are in fact nothing more than a collection of individuals-that
is, who are being represented solely in their individual capacity-a
problem arises. In theory, there is no problem with more than one
person being represented by a single representative; the difficulty
comes in choosing that single representative. If 10,000 people agree
on and choose a single individual as their representative, that is well
and good. But what if they do not agree? In what sense can an indi-
vidual be represented by someone she did not choose, indeed some-
one whom she actually opposes? A group can act through the will of
82. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 36-37, 130-34 (1994).
83. "Essentialism" is the notion that a unitary, "essential" African-American (or
white, or female, etc.) experience can be isolated and described. See Angela Harris, Race
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 585 (1990); see also T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case For Race-Consciousness, 91 COL. L. REv. 1060, 1092 (1991)
(defining essentialism as the claim that "something unites all members of each race and
that races may be differentiated on the basis of these common elements of identity or
culture").
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the majority of the members of the group, but if there is no group,
9,999 votes for a particular representative does nothing to provide
representation for the lone dissenter. An individual qua individual
can never be represented by someone she opposes, if representation is
to be something more than an elaborate fiction.84 For true represen-
tative democracy on an individual basis, every individual would have
to be represented by a representative of her choice, for only then
could we say that that individual has been spoken for and has partici-
pated, vicariously, in the process of governing. Any other form of rep-
resentation necessarily turns on some mediating concept of a group-
some community in which the individual participates and through
which she is represented, despite the fact that she herself did not have
an opportunity to choose that representative. If we dispense with the
concept of the group, there is simply no way for a representative to
represent an individual against her will.
It follows, then, that if representation is truly on an individual
basis, some people will not be represented. If you do not have one
representative for each individual, then it is impossible to ensure that
each individual has a representative of her own choosing. Moreover,
the mechanics of choosing one representative for multiple individuals
require that individuals be grouped in some way for purposes of col-
lectively choosing a representative. If the representative is chosen in a
majority-win format, it is the minority of each grouping that goes
without representation. Thus, significantly, it is the grouping of the
voters that determines which individuals will be represented and
which will not.8 5
There are any number of ways that this grouping can be carried
out. Because the voters are seen to act only in an individual capacity
and not as members of a group-indeed, the "group" has no real
existence-no voter has a right to be grouped with any other voter or
voters. The electorate, for example, could be divided alphabetically.
Suppose, for example, that in a state assembly, there was one repre-
84. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERN-
MENT 102-03 (Liberal Arts Press 1958) (1861) (defining "false democracy" as "the govern-
ment of the whole people by a mere majority of the people, exclusively represented .... to
the complete disenfranchisement of minorities.").
85. T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Samuel Issacharoff refer to these unrepresented vot-
ers as "filler people" in Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v.
Reno, 92 MicH. L. REv. 588, 601 (1993). Although this colorful term does describe the
status of the unrepresented, I believe that it unduly suggests that this problem of un-
representation is uniquely a problem of "constructed" districts-that is, districts drawn to
produce or avoid a particular outcome of the districting conundrum, when in fact the prob-
lem occurs whether or not the individuals have been chosen by anyone to be "filler."
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sentative for every 2500 people. You could take a list of all registered
voters in the state (or all eligible voters, for that matter), arrange it
alphabetically, and assign the first 2500 names to seat A, the second
2500 names to seat B, and so on all the way down the list. You would
then hold an election for each seat.
Traditionally, of course, the grouping has been done geographi-
cally. But unless the geographic districts correspond in some way to
communities of which voters feel a part, there is little difference be-
tween an alphabetic list and a geographic one-each one is little more
than a random grouping.86
The incoherence of these groupings is illustrated in an early vot-
ing rights case, Fortson v. Dorsey.87 In Fortson, certain Georgia voters
challenged the apportionment of the 54 seats in the Georgia Senate.
Thirty-three of the senatorial districts in Georgia were single-member
districts comprised of one or more entire counties. Representatives
from each district were elected by the voters residing there. The re-
maining twenty-one districts were drawn among the seven remaining
counties; each of these counties contained at least two such districts.
Representatives from these remaining twenty-one districts were
elected on a county-wide basis in the county in which the district was
situated, and not by the voters in the district alone. Plaintiffs chal-
lenged this arrangement, arguing that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause by creating one class of voters that directly elected its senator
and another class of voters whose choice can be overruled by other
county residents from outside the district.
In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court upheld the appor-
tionment plan. Justice Brennan conceived of each of the seven coun-
ties at issue as a multimember district, where the representatives were
all elected at large in the district. The smaller units which were de-
noted "districts" were treated by Brennan as mere residency alloca-
tions, as each senator was required to live in the district, and not
merely the county, for which he was elected. Justice Brennan noted in
passing that the combination of single- and multimember districts
used in Fortson could, in theory, "operate to minimize or cancel out
the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting popula-
86. Indeed, it is been argued that there is really very little connection between the
compactness of a district-that is, adherence to geographic principles-and the values to
be achieved by districting. See Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science
Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77 (1985).
87. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
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tion," but found no evidence of such in the case at bar, and thus ex-
plored the issue no further.
But what was the unit of representation in Fortson? Brennan
conceptualized the case as representation by county; Justice Douglas,
in dissent, focused on the actual district. When viewed from that per-
spective, it would indeed seem odd that voters from outside these dis-
tricts had a say in choosing their representatives. Both Brennan and
Douglas recognized that another kind of representation altogether-
that of "racial or political elements of the voting population" might
also be implicated.
The basic problem in Fortson is the incoherence of the individual
approach to representation. What was really being represented in
Fortson were individuals, not districts or counties. But these individu-
als had to be grouped in order to elect representatives. Some individ-
uals were being grouped with a relatively small number of other
voters while others were grouped together with a larger number of
other voters. Neither the county nor the ostensible district had any
real significance.88 Thus, the Court's efforts to figure out if the "real"
unit here was the district or the county were bound to lead to
confusion.
However the grouping is done, the problem of individual repre-
sentation still exists. Because the grouping determines which voters
will be unrepresented, it can be manipulated to ensure that certain
voters-or certain types of voters-are consistently chosen to go with-
out representation. That is what happened with the counties in Mis-
sissippi at issue in Allen. They arranged the voting so that the
individuals who would go unrepresented would be disproportionately
African-Americans.
But it is important to note that even if the grouping were carried
out in a way that was completely neutral and that could be freed from
all manipulation, a portion of the electorate would still go unrepre-
sented in a majority-win system. The unrepresented would be chosen
under such a system, in effect, by lot (and indeed, it would probably
not be possible to tell in advance of the election who the unrepre-
sented would be).8 9
88. It seems likely that the apportionment scheme in Fortson derived from an earlier
time when representation was understood to occur on a county-wide basis, as the integrity
of the county as a unit of representation seems to underlie the combination of district- and
county-wide voting.
89. Even so, this works no great injustice (and indeed may have certain advantages
over other, more representative systems) so long as the burden of unrepresentation is ro-
tated. Those who are represented today-that is, those who voted for the winning candi-
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What Allen and the cases that followed it recognized was that any
districting system inevitably disenfranchises some voters. In essence,
what these cases determined was that those disenfranchised voters
could not legally be disproportionately African-American. But in or-
der to accomplish that, of course, it was necessary to look beyond an
individual perspective and adopt a communal perspective. Put an-
other way, the facts of Allen and the cases that immediately followed
dramatically illustrated the danger of ignoring the districting conun-
drum, and caused the Court to take a different look at representation
in order to address the conundrum.
I1. Communal Representation and The Supreme Court
A. The Communal Approach to Representation
A communal theory of representation is one that views a racial or
ethnic community as the fundamental unit of representation. Under a
communal theory of representation, it is the group, and not merely the
individuals within that group, that is entitled to representation. With-
out express acknowledgment, beginning with the Allen case in 1969,
the Supreme Court has incorporated the communal approach to rep-
resentation into its voting rights jurisprudence. Moreover, Congress
adopted and enacted a communal approach to representation into the
1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act.
In Allen, the Court struck down the Mississippi law changing the
county board of supervisor elections from district-based to at-large
voting. The Court's reasoning is brief and instructive: "The right to
vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an
absolute prohibition on casting a ballot."90
date-may go unrepresented tomorrow, when their candidate loses. If the grouping
principle is truly neutral, then no individual should find herself permanently among the
unrepresented. Moreover, even where the grouping principle is not neutral, and the sys-
tem is manipulated, the privilege of being represented may continue to shift and rotate, if
the system is manipulated along lines that themselves change. For example, electoral lines
may be drawn to favor Democratic candidates over Republicans. An individual may vote
Republican at one time, and Democratic another. Such a voter is not permanently unrep-
resented. In these cases, individual representation in majority-win districts may be inco-
herent and flawed, in that it does not provide representation for everyone, but the flaw
does not so fundamentally undermine the system as to make it undemocratic. Where,
however, particular groups in society are made permanent minorities, forever designated
to go without representation, individual representation in this form ceases to be a kind of
democracy, and becomes instead a tyranny by the majority over the minority. See Guinier,
supra note 13 at 1080.
90. Allen v. Board of Supervisors, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969).
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With this statement, the Court took a remarkable leap from one
conception of representation to another. The Court in Allen cited
Reynolds v. Sims in support of its claim about vote dilution, and Reyn-
olds does hold that the right to vote can be affected by vote dilution.91
But Reynolds addressed the dilution of an individual elector's vote,
the situation where one person's vote carries more weight than an-
other's. That was not the case in Mississippi under the law challenged
in Allen. In the at-large voting scheme at issue, every vote was equal
to every other vote, individually. So whose right to vote was being
diluted in Allen? Clearly, the rights of African-Americans as a group.
But that implies that African-Americans have an interest in voting as
a group, separate and apart from the interest of each African-Ameri-
can individual. Thus, recognition that representation ought to take
place on a group, rather than merely an individual basis, is fundamen-
tal to the Allen case.92
The only other explanation for the Allen decision would be that
the Court was concerned that specific individual African-Americans
had been denied representation. The problem with this explanation is
that in a system of individual representation, some individuals are al-
ways denied representation. The Court has never found this to be
objectionable and indeed has specifically held that it is not
actionable. 93
91. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 556 (1964).
92. These differing uses of term dilution correspond to the distinction that Professor
Karlan has made between "quantitative dilution" and "qualitative dilution." See Karlan,
supra note 13, at 173. Professor Karlan uses the term "quantitative dilution" to refer to the
kind of vote dilution at issue in Reynolds, when a "mathematical analysis ... shows that
votes of persons in one district are devalued relative to the votes of persons" in another
district, and "qualitative dilution" to refer to the kind of dilution at issue in Allen, where
the electoral method "impairs the political effectiveness of an identifiable subgroup of the
electorate." In this latter situation, Professor Karlan argues, it is the "quality" of represen-
tation that has been impaired, rather than the "quantity." Id. at 176. It should be clear,
however, that Professor Karlan's distinction also turns on a change of focus from the indi-
vidual to the group: in her definition of "quantitative dilution," it is "persons" whose vote
is diluted, while her definition of "qualitative dilution" makes clear that it is "an identifi-
able subgroup" whose rights have been impaired.
93. The Court observed:
Arguably the losing candidates' supporters are without representation since the
men they voted for have been defeated; arguably they have been denied equal
protection of the law since they have no legislative voice of their own. This is true
of both single-member and multi-member districts. But we have not yet deemed
it a denial of equal protection to deny legislative seats to losing candidates ....
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971). It should be emphasized that plaintiffs in
Whitcomb were alleging precisely that they were being denied representation because they
were African-American. But the Court found that the absence of ghetto representation
resulted not from bias, but rather from losing elections! 403 U.S. at 153.
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One could attempt to explain Allen by arguing that even though
some individuals must go unrepresented, a discrete and insular minor-
ity, such as African-Americans, should not be singled out to be the
unrepresented, but this does not lead to the remedies prescribed by
the Voting Rights Act and the Court in the post-Allen cases. The ap-
propriate remedy in such a case would be a truly neutral system of
districting, that would ensure that African-Americans were not sin-
gled out, on the basis of race, to be disproportionately among the un-
represented. But a remedy that goes beyond this and requires actual
representation of the African-American community cannot be under-
stood in terms of the individual theory of representation, because such
a remedy would actually prescribe that African-Americans alone
could not be among the unrepresented. Moreover, the Court itself
described the infirmity in Allen as a problem of vote dilution, and not
as one of lack of representation and there is no reason not to take the
Court at its word here.
Indeed, wherever the Court speaks of the dilution of the voting
strength of a particular segment of the population, it is employing the
communal conception of representation. This concept simply doesn't
exist if we look at voting and representation purely at the individual
level. 94 Moreover, although it has stopped short of expressly acknowl-
edging or endorsing a communal approach to representation, the
Court itself has recognized that only such a conception can explain
dilution cases like Allen.95
To the extent that Allen can be explained only with reference to
communal concepts of representation, the case represents a turning
point in the Supreme Court's voting rights jurisprudence. It is true
that prior to Allen, the Court had suggested at least twice that vote
dilution on a group basis might be an issue, but in neither instance did
the Court actually employ such an analysis to decide the case.96 And
although Gomillion v. Lightfoot97 is often cited as an early case of
racial gerrymandering (and thus might be seen by some as an instance
94. See Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2594 (Thomas, J., concurring).
95. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 78-79 (1980); see also Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2594
(Thomas, J., concurring).
96. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966) and Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433
(1965) both acknowledge the possibility that a particular voting scheme might "operate to
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting
population." Burns, 384 U.S. at 88; Fortson, 379 U.S. at 438. In neither of these cases,
however, was the scheme at issue alleged to do this, so the Court had no cause to consider
further the implications of this notion.
97. 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960).
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when the Court turned to a communal view of representation to
counteract racist manipulation of individual representation), I do not
believe that Gomillion is properly viewed in that light. In Gomillion,
the borders of Tuskegee, Alabama, were redrawn into an "uncouth"
twenty-eight-sided-figure, the effect of which was to exclude African-
Americans from the municipal electorate. Because Gomillion in-
volved oddly shaped, gerrymandered borders, it is easy to think of the
case as similar to other cases that involve manipulation of electoral
districting. But Gomillion did not involve manipulation of the group-
ing of the electorate so as to ensure that African-Americans would be
disproportionately in the minority. Rather, Gomillion is an individual
voting rights case. The problem in Gomillion isn't with the way black
voters are grouped-it is- that blacks were excluded from voting alto-
gether. Gomillion is thus an old-style vote-deprivation case. Indeed,
the Court made that clear in holding that the legislature in Gomillion
was "solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by
fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-
existing municipal vote."98 The Gomillion Court was concerned with
the deprivation of the right to vote; it simply did not address the issue
from the perspective of the "dilution" of "minority voting strength."99
In Allen, however, there was no other approach that would lead
to the result in that case, for unlike Gomillion, no one would be ex-
cluded from the polls under the Mississippi scheme at issue. Thus Al-
len represents a true shift in perspective from an individual- to a
group-centered conception of voting rights.
To see how sharp a departure Allen was from the individual ap-
proach to voting, it is instructive to contrast the Allen decision with
the Court's opinion in Whitcomb v. Chavis'00 two years later. In Whit-
comb, plaintiffs alleged both that their individual votes were diluted
98. Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
99. The Court itself confirmed this interpretation in Reynolds v. Sims when it de-
scribed Gomillion as involving "gerrymandering... which result[s] in denying some citi-
zens their right to vote." 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1904) (citations omitted). Because Reynolds is
itself a vote dilution case, if the Court had viewed Gomillion as involving vote dilution, it
would have been natural for the Court to describe it that way.
This is not to say that the issue in Gomillion cannot be viewed as a case about dilution
of voting strength. Indeed, the case may be simpler and clearer when so understood.
Nonetheless, there is nothing in Gomillion to indicate that at the time the case was de-
cided, the Supreme Court was thinking of the group rights of African-Americans, rather
than the individual right of each African-American (former) resident of 'uskegee to cast a
vote. More importantly, the Court did not need a group model of voting to find the defect
in the scheme in Gomillion; the same cannot be said of the scheme in Allen.
100. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
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by an Indiana electoral system that mixed single-member district and
multimember districts,101 and also that the voting strength of blacks as
a group had been minimized.
The district court accepted the group theory of representation in
its entirety. In finding for the plaintiffs on their claim that their voting
power as a group had been minimized, the district court sought to
protect "'the legally cognizable racial minority group against dilution
of its voting strength.""o 0 2 As a remedy, the lower court came up with
its own districting plan that, as described by the Supreme Court, was
"expressly aimed at giving 'recognition to the cognizable racial minor-
ity group whose grievance lead [sic] to this litigation.""11 0 3
In reversing the district court, however, the Supreme Court held
that, despite its decision in Allen, it was not prepared to recognize the
right to group representation. The Court found nothing to suggest
that ghetto residents had "less opportunity than did other Marion
County residents to participate in the political processes and to elect
legislators of their choice."'01 4 Moreover, the Court made clear what it
believed this opportunity to mean:
We have discovered nothing in the record or in the court's findings
indicating that poor Negroes were not allowed to register or vote, to
choose the political party they desired to support, to participate in
its affairs or to be equally represented on those occasions when leg-
islative candidates were chosen. Nor did the evidence purport to
show or the court find that inhabitants of the ghetto were regularly
excluded from the slates of both major parties, thus denying them
the chance of occupying legislative seats. 05
Thus, the court relied on purely individual indicia of voting rights
and participation to uphold the Indiana scheme. Indeed, the Court
noted that the voting power of ghetto residents "may have been 'can-
celled out,' as the district court held, but this seems a mere euphe-
mism for political defeat at the polls.' 0 6 Whitcomb thus turns a blind
eye to precisely the problem recognized in Allen: that the votes of any
group can be nullified if the electoral system is rigged to ensure that
the group will always be a minority in the relevant grouping for repre-
101. Plaintiffs offered a mathematical model of voting strength designed to show that a
multimember district with three times the population of a single-member district was in
fact greatly overrepresented if it had three members to the single-member district's one.
The Court rejected this model as entirely theoretical. Id. at 145-46 nn.23-24.
102. Id. at 139 (quoting Chavis v. Whitcomb, 307 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (S.D. Ind. 1969)).
103. Id. at 139 (quoting Chavis, 307 F. Supp. at 1366) (correction in original).
104. Id. at 149.
105. Id. at 149.
106. Id. at 153.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
July 1995] THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1491
sentation.10 7 Indeed, the wrongs alleged in Allen seem to be the same
wrongs as were alleged in Whitcomb-at-large voting used to dilute
minority voting power-with the Court reaching very different results
through application of very different conceptions of what was at stake.
Whitcomb, however, is an anomaly. The cases that followed Al-
len for the most part adopt the communal views of representation re-
flected in Allen. In Perkins v. Matthews, 0 8 for example, the Court
held that a municipal annexation that decreased the percentage of
black citizens within the city limits was subject to challenge under sec-
tion 5 on the ground that it decreased minority voting strength.
Although the Court did not discuss what it meant by "dilution" in this
context, once again only a communal theory of representation could
support the Court's conclusion. In one sense, of course, any increase
in the population of a municipality results in vote dilution. If prior to
the increase, there was one representative for every 5,000 persons, and
if after the increase there is now one representative for every 5,100
persons, then the vote of every individual has been diluted from =1/
5,000 to =1/5,100, regardless of how the increase in population oc-
curred. Clearly, this is not the kind of vote dilution addressed in
Reynolds, cited by the Court as the source of its "dilution" analysis.
For although the vote of every individual has been absolutely diluted
in this scenario, there has been no relative dilution. Because every-
one's vote has been diluted, each person's vote is equal to that of eve-
ryone else. Reynolds was concerned with relative dilution-when
some people's votes counted more than others-not absolute dilution
that occurs whenever the population of a political unit grows.
The annexation in Perkins must have caused some absolute vote
dilution. But this can hardly be what subjected it to the coverage of
the Voting Rights Act. Moreover, viewed from an individual perspec-
tive, there was no relative vote dilution in Perkins: following the an-
nexation every citizen's vote still had equal weight. It is only when we
consider the voting strength of African-Americans as a group that the
concept of relative vote dilution makes sense in this context. Commu-
107. In fact, the Court in Whitcomb recognized that in a winner-take-all style of elec-
tion, "Arguably the losing candidates' supporters are without representation since the
men they voted for have been defeated; arguably they have been denied equal protection
of the laws since they have no legislative voice of their own." 403 U.S. at 153. But the
Court still viewed this as a problem of unrepresented individuals, not of an unrepresented
group. Indeed, the Court expressly rejected the group notion of representation in Whit-
comb, in part because of the difficulty of determining which groups are entitled to be
recognized.
108. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
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nal representation, then, provides the theoretical basis for the Perkins
case just as it did for Allen.10 9
Similarly, in Gaffney v. Cummings"0 and White v. Regester,"' the
Court relied on a communal approach to representation in its analysis
of multimember districts. In Gaffney, Connecticut's legislative dis-
tricting plan was challenged because it attempted to create Republi-
can and Democratic districts in proportion to Republican and
Democratic voters in the state. The Court upheld the plan as valid,
stating that only if racial or political groups were "fenced out of the
political process and their voting strength invidiously minimized"
would the plan be struck." 2
In White, the companion case to Gaffney, the Court invalidated
certain multimember districts upon showing that they diluted minority
voting strength. The Supreme Court in White takes the individualistic
notions in Whitcomb v. Chavis and turns them on their head. In Whit-
comb, the Court had refused to strike down multimember districts be-
cause there was no showing that individual African-Americans were
denied the right to register or vote, that is that individual African-
Americans had "less opportunity" than other residents "to participate
in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice."" 3 In
White, the Court used this language to strike down multimember dis-
tricts in Texas, but with a critical change. No longer was it "ghetto
residents" who had to have been denied equal participation in the
political processes; rather the Court in White held that the touchstone
for challenging multi-member districts was evidence that "the political
processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to
participation by the group in question." 114
This was not simply a careless change in language, for the Court's
application of this standard in White showed a greater focus on the
group than had its application of the similar standard in Whitcomb.
The Court in Whitcomb focused its analysis on registration, voting,
109. Similarly, in City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159 (1982), the Court
evaluated two consolidations and an annexation, along with accompanying changes in the
structure of the city council, in accordance with the effect such changes would have on the
voting strength of the black community.
110. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
111. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
112. Indeed, the Court held there was no basis to invalidate a plan that "undertakes,
not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but to recognize
it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of proportional representation in the legis-
lative halls of the State." 412 U.S. at 754.
113. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149.
114. White, 412 U.S. at 766 (emphasis added).
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and participation in party affairs, all ways that individuals can partici-
pate in the political process. The Court in White looked at these fac-
tors, too. But the Court in White broadened its analysis, looking at
structural aspects of slating and primaries that, while not in them-
selves improper or invidious, nonetheless enhanced opportunities for
discrimination. 115 The Court also examined the effects of these struc-
tures as well as the racial campaign tactics prevalent in the counties in
question to reach its conclusion that "the black community has been
effectively excluded from participation" in the political process. 116
The Court's language in White as well as its shift to a group notion of
voting rights is critical because in 1982, in amending the Voting Rights
Act, Congress looked to the White case to provide the standards for
the vote-dilution analysis, incorporating directly into the statute the
Court's language.
In City of Rome v. United States,117 Rome, Georgia, changed its
City Commission and Board of Education from plurality-win elections
for all seats to majority-win elections for numbered seats, with run-off
elections whenever there was no majority winner. The Court held
that these changes had the effect of diluting black voting power and
struck them down. A similar scheme was also invalidated in Rogers v.
Lodge' where the Court found that it had been maintained for the
purpose of diluting the voting strength of African-Americans.
In all of these cases, the Court looked to the voting strength of
minority groups, rather than to the voting power of the individual. In
doing so, the Court implicitly adopted the notion that it is the group,
rather than the individual, that is entitled to representation.
In 1982, Congress incorporated this concept of representation
into the Voting Rights Act itself. The 1982 amendments to the Act
were a response to the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Mobile v.
Bolden, 1 9 the companion case to Rome v. United States. Mobile v.
Bolden involved an electoral scheme nearly identical to the one struck
down in Rome and also in Rogers. The difference between Mobile
and Rome was that in Rome, the majority-win system was put into
place in 1966, whereas the Mobile system had been in effect since
1911. That meant that Rome, but not Mobile, was covered by section
5, which applies to changes in voting procedures. Because the major-
115. Id. at 766-67.
116. i at 767 (quoting Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 726 (W.D. Tex. 1972)).
117. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
118. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
119. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
July 1995]
ity-win scheme in Mobile was not a change in voting procedures, it
could be challenged only under section 2 of the Act. In Mobile v.
Bolden, however, the Court held that a section 2 violation required
proof of discriminatory intent, although a showing of discriminatory
effect was sufficient under section 5.
Even though Mobile v. Bolden seriously limited the scope of sec-
tion 2, it nonetheless incorporated the communal notion of represen-
tation to the extent that it recognized that the voting strength of a
group could indeed be diluted.120 In 1982, Congress legislatively over-
ruled Mobile by amending the Voting Rights Act to make it clear that
proof of discriminatory effect was sufficient to make out a violation of
section 2. In doing so, however, Congress incorporated into the Vot-
ing Rights Act the communal theory of representation inherent in the
notion of minority voting strength.
Congress need not have incorporated this view, if all it wanted to
accomplish was to overrule Mobile. At the time the Mobile case was
120. Indeed, this is clear from the Rogers case, decided two years later. Rogers in-
volved a majority-win scheme similar to that challenged in both Rome and Mobile. As in
Mobile, and unlike Rome, Rogers was a § 2 case, because the electoral system had been in
place prior to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act. The plaintiffs in Rogers prevailed
because they were able to demonstrate that the system was being maintained in order to
dilute African-American voting strength. Thus, Rogers further makes clear that the only
reason the Mobile voting system was not invalidated was because the Court believed it was
necessary to show discriminatory intent.
One sentence in the Court's decision in Mobile v. Bolden seems to evoke the individ-
ual view of representation, but overall Mobile, as noted above, is based on a communal
approach. The basic holding of the case was that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Fif-
teenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment all
required a showing of purposeful discrimination. In its discussion of the Fourteenth
amendment, the Court assumed that the issue was "the lack of representation multimem-
ber districts afford various elements of the voting population." 446 U.S. at 65. The Court
had no trouble with this concept of vote dilution; the problem in Mobile is the Court's
insistence on a showing of intent. Because the at-large system had been established in
Mobile in 1911, at a time when African-Americans were effectively prevented from voting,
the Court could not say that the system was designed in order to dilute their (nonexistent)
vote.
This analysis makes all the more curious Justice Stevens's passing note that because
African-Americans "register and vote without hindrance" in Mobile, there was no pur-
poseful discrimination. Such a comment completely ignores issues of vote-dilution, and
focuses instead only the individual's right to cast a vote. Despite this remark, however,
Mobile should not be seen as a return to an individual notion of representation. The thrust
of the opinion is so clearly on the issue of intent, and the Fourteenth Amendment analysis
so explicitly employs a communal notion of vote-dilution, that it seems unlikely that Ste-
vens really meant that the issue of intent was resolved solely by the question of registration
and actual voting. Indeed, there is no serious question in the opinion that plaintiffs had not
proven intent, and Stevens was not attempting to resolve this point when he made his
remark.
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decided, section 2 provided: "No voting qualification or prerequisite
to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or ap-
plied... to deny or abridge the right of any citizen to vote on account
of race or color ... .-"121 The 1982 amendment altered this provision
to read: "No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or stan-
dard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied.., in a man-
ner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen
of the United States to vote on account of race or color .... "122
This change was by itself sufficient to overrule the holding in Mo-
bile by making it clear that it was the discriminatory result, not the
intent, that was prohibited. But Congress did not stop there. In addi-
tion to this change, Congress added subsection (b), providing that "[a]
violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of the
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes . . . are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens pro-
tected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 23
This language is significant, because it can mean only that Con-
gress based the 1982 amendments on the group theory of representa-
tion.124 If Congress had meant the statute to apply only to individuals,
it would have said "to vote for a representative of their choice," for
individuals have no right to elect anybody. Only a group can actually
elect representatives. Moreover, the language of section 2(b) is drawn
directly from White v. Regester, where it clearly refers to a group the-
ory of representation.
That the 1982 amendments codified a group theory of representa-
tion is also clear from the legislative history of the amendments. The
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (emphasis added) (repealed 1982).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
124. Congress took this language from the opinion in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
766 (1972), where it is clear that the Court was looking at vote-dilution from the perspec-
tive of group rights. See supra text accompanying notes 111-16. Interestingly enough, how-
ever, the White decision is not the original source of this phrase. Rather the phrase "less
opportunity ... to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their
choice" appears originally in Whitcomb v. Chavis, where it clearly refers to the rights of
individuals, not groups. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149. In incorporating this language into the
Act in 1982, however, Congress explicitly stated that it was looking to the White case, and
thus the group-rights focus of White rather than the individual-rights focus of Whitcomb
would seem clearly to have intended. Moreover, I would still argue that the language by its
very terms incorporates a group approach to voting rights and that its appearance in Whit-
comb is incoherent.
July 1995] 1495
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Senate Report, setting out the history and purpose of the amend-
ments, focuses on the need to preserve the viability of (Allen-type)
vote dilution cases.125 The Report notes that "Reynolds involved dilu-
tion of votes as a result of population disparities among legislative
districts, but six months later the Supreme Court recognized that pop-
ulation differences were not the only way in which a facially neutral
districting plan might unconstitutionally undervalue the votes of some
and overvalue the votes of others."1 26 The Report goes on to express
concern about the impact of Bolden specifically on vote dilution
cases,127 and then to note that the amendment is "meant to restore the
pre-Mobile legal standard which governed cases challenging elections
systems or practices as an illegal dilution of the minority vote."'128 The
Report specifically cites Perkins v. Matthews, a case employing a
group conception of voting rights as "consistent with Congressional
intent."' 29 Moreover, it is clear that the codification of the language
of White v. Regester was no accident: the Report is explicit that the
amendments were intended to codify the White case. 30 Moreover,
some of those who opposed the 1982 amendments did so precisely
because they understood the legislation to enact a group theory of
representation. Thus Senator Hatch wrote, "Instead of directing its
protections toward the individual citizen as did the original Act... the
amendments would make racial and ethnic groups the basic unit of
protection.'' 1
The 1982 amendments highlight an interesting ambiguity in the
term "results." It is commonly understood that the 1982 amendments
changed section 2 from an intent-oriented provision to a result-ori-
ented provision. But "results" has two different meanings here. The
basic meaning, as used by the Court in Mobile v. Bolden, is simply that
actual intent to discriminate is not required. Thus, if the location of
polling places, for example, had the effect of making it difficult for
125. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-27 (1982) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT],
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 197-204.
126. Id. at 20, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 197.
127. Id. at 26, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 203.
128. Id. at 27, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 8, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 185 (citing Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379
(1971)).
130. The Senate Report clearly states that "[t]he amendment also adds a new subsec-
tion to Section 2 which delineates the legal standards under the results test by codifying the
leading pre-Bolden vote dilution case, White v. Regester." Id at 94, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
179. Throughout the Report, White v. Regester is cited as the touchstone for what Congress
intends its amendments to do.
131. Id. at 193, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 267 (emphasis in original).
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African-Americans to cast their votes, then such, locations could be
found to violate section 2 even in the absence of evidence that the
locations had been chosen for that reason. In this sense, a "results"
test has nothing to do with the results of elections, but rather with the
actual effect a "standard, practice, or procedure" has on the ability of
members of a minority group to cast their votes.
The other meaning of "results" is quite different. In its broader
sense, a "results test" refers to the effect of a practice on a group's
ability to affect the outcome of elections. In this sense, it means that it
is not enough for members of a minority group to cast their ballots,
but that they must have an actual ability to elect candidates of their
choice, or to affect the result of the election. In this sense, a "results"
test means taking up the challenge of the districting conundrum, and
ensuring that members of a minority group actually have the opportu-
nity to have a say in the outcome of an election.
This second meaning of results test must be distinguished, how-
ever, from a true outcomes test, which Congress explicitly rejected.
The group-oriented results test that I have described looks at whether
a group has the ability to affect the outcome of elections. It does not
look at the actual outcomes of elections. Thus, this kind of "results
test" does not look at who was actually elected, but only at whether
minority groups had an opportunity to affect the outcome. 132
Following the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, the
Court continued to apply the communal approach to representation in
analyzing challenges under the Voting Rights Act, and indeed further
fleshed out the meaning of that approach. In Thomburg v. Gingles,133
the Court attempted to define what constitutes a community or group
entitled to communal voting rights. The Court announced three crite-
ria that must be satisfied before a group can bring a claim of vote
132. In his remarks on the 192 amendments in the Senate Report, Senator Dole noted
that "Citizens of all races are entitled to have an equal chance of electing candidates of
their choice, but if they are fairly afforded that opportunity and lose, the law should offer
no redress." Ild. at 193, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 364. That Senator Dole's remark was offered
in support of a "results" test only highlights the ambiguity of his remark. Certainly, his
emphasis on the lack of redress when minority candidates lose is a rejection of an out-
comes test. It is less clear what kind of results test Dole is endorsing. That depends en-
tirely on what we understand "an equal chance of electing candidates of their choice" to
mean. A districting scheme that aggregates certain voters in a way that renders their votes
irrelevant might well be understood to deprive those voters of "an equal chance of electing
candidates of their choice"; such a construction would adopt the broader, group-based
meaning of a "result" test, rather than the narrower test that would look only at the effect
on individuals.
133. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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dilution: (1) "the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it
is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a major-
ity in a single-member district"; (2) the minority must demonstrate
that it is politically cohesive; and (3) the minority must show that
there is majority bloc voting-that is, that majority voters do not vote
for minority candidates. 134 A minority group that meets these criteria
is entitled to an electoral structure that will allow it to elect represent-
atives in proportion to its numbers; a minority group that does not
meet these criteria has, under Gingles, no such right.135 Obviously,
there is no need to define which groups are entitled to representation
unless a communal concept of representation is assumed.
The communal theory of representation has not, however, proved
to be a panacea for the ills identified in Allen. For with the communal
theory of representation comes the districting conundrum: if commu-
nities are the unit of representation, how much representation should
each community get? In addition, as demonstrated in Gingles, the
communal theory of representation may require that we define which
communities are entitled to representation. Finally, the very notion of
communal representation is based on an essentialist philosophy that
may result in large numbers of individuals being excluded from the
democratic process.
Although these problems are inherent in the use of communal
representation, they may not have been immediately obvious in part
because of the way in which geographic districting has been used to
conceal the adoption of a communal approach to representation.
134. Id. at 50-51.
135. Gingles is based on a peculiar hybrid of the communal theory of representation
with a purely geographical approach. Under Gingles, minority voting rights depend on
racially-segregated housing patterns-if minority group members live close to one another,
they may be geographically compact enough to meet the first criterion; if they are dis-
persed throughout the white community-even if in smaller, segregated enclaves-they
will not. It is difficult to understand why this should be so.
One possible answer is that minority groups in compact communities do not have
greater rights than minority groups that are dispersed-it is simply easier to recognize
racially-motivated districting when the Gingles criteria are met. This would make Gingles
purely a case about proof.
The problem with this approach is that it leaves the Court without a theory of how
plaintiffs who meet the Gingles criteria have been harmed. It is true that, having met the
criteria, plaintiffs can show that at-large voting has been chosen for racially-motivated rea-
sons. But the majority has a right to choose at-large voting, thereby depriving minority
group members of an effective electoral voice, so long as they do not do so for the wrong
reasons-for reasons of racial bias. Put another way, the majority has not abridged any
voting rights that the minority actually had-it has simply acted with an intent to do so.
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B. Communal Representation and Geography
Despite its widespread adoption in case law and statute, commu-
nal representation has never been used as the exclusive approach to
representation. Rather the Court, as Gingles (and other cases) dem-
onstrates, has combined communal representation with a geographic
approach to districting.
In Gingles, the Court grafted a requirement of geographical com-
pactness onto the theory of group representation, in effect affording
voting rights protection only to those minority groups that were also
geographically compact. Gingles thus suggested that one characteris-
tic of a group that is entitled to recognition is geographic compactness.
It is difficult to see why this should be so. Our sense that African-
Americans make up a distinct racial community-and that they are so
viewed by their white neighbors-does not really turn on the degree
to which housing remains racially segregated. Paradoxically, commu-
nal representation is more necessary, not less, where residential segre-
gation is incomplete. Where you have true segregation, geographic
representation by itself, without appeal to the concept of group voting
strength, provides minority representation. Partial integration threat-
ens to dilute this voting strength without decreasing the significance of
racial categories in the minds of American voters.
The problem is that the two approaches-communal representa-
tion and geographic districting-are conceptually incompatible. Geo-
graphic districting is essentially a method for dividing up individual
voters. It is true that, at least theoretically, geography could also pro-
vide the basis for an alternative conception of communal representa-
tion, where the communities to be represented are defined
geographically, rather than ethnically. However, the current mobility
of American society, combined with the indistinctness of geography in
a country of sprawling development, makes such a conception unreal-
istic as well as unworkable. Although individuals may derive some
sense of identity from geography largely defined at the local level at
which districting takes place, the distinctions that must be made sim-
ply do not appear to correspond to meaningful distinctions in the
groups with which voters identify. That is to say, voters may identify
in some meaningful way with the town in which they live, but they do
not identify with one particular combination of their town with other
neighboring towns, as opposed to other possible combinations. Thus,
it makes sense to treat the current use of geography in districting as
providing administrative divisions among individual voters, rather
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than as representing true communities that are being represented in
themselves.
This combination of individual representation, geographically de-
fined, with communal representation is, however, incoherent. If vot-
ers are treated as individuals, to be divided up administratively, then
the communities to which they belong have no group rights to repre-
sentation. On the other hand, if the community is the true source of
representation, then the geographic dispersion of the individual mem-
bers of the group ought to be irrelevant. The problem with combining
these two theories is that the combination, which says that minority
groups are entitled to communal representation that cannot be un-
fairly diluted if and only if the group is residentially segregated, is not
a principle that one would wish to uphold. It adds a roadblock to
representation by requiring minority groups to meet an extra condi-
tion before qualifying. Moreover, by enshrining residential segrega-
tion as the bedrock of political power, it discourages more integrated
housing patterns.
Although individual, geographically based representation and
communally based representation are conceptually two different
things that cannot be coherently combined, the Court's blurring of
these theories is understandable, because they have often
coincided. 136
In any event, the uncoupling of communal representation from
geography does make the uses and implications of communal repre-
sentation clearer and provides an opportunity to identify the limita-
tions and weaknesses in that approach. These problems have inhered
in communal representation from the beginning, but were by and
large ignored. Now that it is no longer possible to ignore them, we
can see that they have always been there.
136. The temptation to combine these two theories, and the difficulty of doing so, is
illustrated in Justice Ginsburg's moving dissent in this Term's latest voting rights case,
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). Arguing that ethnicity is a valid basis for repre-
sentation-that is, arguing for a communal approach to representation-Ginsburg notes
that "legislators classify voters in groups-by economic, geographical, political or social
characteristics .... That ethnicity defines some of these groups is a political reality.... If
Chinese-Americans and Russian-Americans may seek and secure group recognition in the
delineation of voting districts, then African-Americans should not be dissimilarly treated."
Id. at 2506 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But Ginsburg herself recognizes that the ethnic dis-
tricts to which she refers are in cities with ethnic neighborhoods so that geography and
ethnicity combine. Id. at 2505. Thus, the districts that Justice Ginsburg uses to illustrate
her argument in favor of communal representation could be nothing more than geographic
districts of individuals.
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C. The Limitations of Communal Representation
The difficulty with the communal approach to representation is
that it eventually forces us to confront the districting conundrum.
And when we do confront this central question-how much represen-
tation each group should get-we inevitably discover that the ques-
tion is unanswerable. If the purpose of recognizing group or
communal representation has been primarily to identify when a par-
ticular group is getting less than its fair share of representation-when
its votes, taken together, have been diluted-we need to know what
that fair share "should" be.
There are really two different concepts of dilution involved here,
only one of which raises the difficult question. First, we might say that
the voting strength of a group has been diluted when the voting
strength is changed in such a way that the group now has less voting
strength than it did before, a kind of "temporal vote dilution." This
concept is adequate if all we care about is ensuring that a group does
not become worse off than it was before. Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act is aimed at preventing temporal vote dilution. But the
concept of temporal vote dilution is of limited use. Although it pro-
tects groups from an erosion of representation, it does nothing actu-
ally to improve their situation. It grandfathers in a baseline that may
or may not have been fair in the first place. We should not be sur-
prised when a historically disadvantaged group demands that we do
better than simply not make it worse off, nor are we entitled to believe
that we have rectified past injustices merely by freezing an unjust sta-
tus quo.
If we wish to do more, we need a different concept of vote dilu-
tion. Thus, we might say that the voting strength of a group has been
diluted if the group has less voting strength than it should have, or
than other groups have. It is in order to address this kind of vote
dilution-what I call "comparative vote dilution"- that we need
some notion of what the voting strength of the group "should be."
The districting conundrum is about comparative vote dilution-it asks
us to identify when a group has been allotted fewer seats than it
"ought" to have.
Within a few years of the Allen decision, the Court was con-
fronted with cases presenting the districting conundrum in this form.
Until recently, however, the Court was, for the most part, able to
avoid actually determining the answer to the question of how much
representation is the "right" amount.
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In White v. Regester,137 for example, African- and Mexican-
Americans challenged a multimember districting scheme in Texas
which, they alleged, unfairly diluted their voting strength. Finding
that, on the facts before it, African- and Mexican-Americans were un-
fairly excluded from the political process, the Court held that the mul-
timember scheme unconstitutionally diluted the voting strength of
these groups, and struck it down. The scheme in White was challenged
under the Fifteenth Amendment, not under section 5. Thus, temporal
vote dilution was not at issue; and the only kind of vote dilution that
the Court could have been talking about was comparative vote
dilution.
But compared to what? The Court didn't say. It found the multi-
member voting system dilutive by looking at the overall circumstances
in Dallas and Bexar Counties. Finding that African-Americans (in
Dallas County) and Mexican-Americans (in Bexar County) were not
able to participate equally in the political and electoral processes, the
Court determined that the system was dilutive of minority voting
strength, apparently reasoning that if it were not dilutive then Afri-
can- and Mexican-Americans would have had equal access to the
process.
As a remedy, the Court in White ordered Texas to adopt single-
member districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties. The Court said noth-
ing about how many, if any, of these single-member districts African-
Americans or Mexican-Americans should control. Thus, the Court
got rid of one system that it found diluted voting strength, but re-
placed it with another that might-or might not-also dilute voting
strength, depending on how the district lines were drawn. The Court
did not say how much representation African-Americans or Mexican-
Americans should have under the new system.
White was not the only case in which the Court applied the con-
cept of comparative vote dilution without addressing the underlying
issue of voting strength. In City of Richmond v. United States,138 the
voting strength of African-Americans in Richmond, Virginia, was al-
leged to have been diluted as a result of municipal annexation of cer-
tain predominantly white areas. Prior to annexation, blacks
constituted 52 percent of the city; following annexation blacks would
make up 42 percent of the population. Clearly, in the at-large city
137. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
138. 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
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council elections, black voting strength would be less than it had been
prior to the annexation.
The Court, however, was unwilling to turn any particular percent-
age of voting strength into an absolute right. The Court would neither
disapprove the annexation nor require the City of Richmond to ac-
cord blacks the same voting power they had had prior to annexation.
Rather, the Court held that so long as Richmond made certain
changes in its voting procedures such that the system "fairly re-
flect[ed] the strength of the [African-American] community as it ex-
ist[ed] after the annexation," the annexation could proceed. 139 The
Court did not explain what it meant by "fairly represent[ing] the
strength of the [African-American] community." Without some the-
ory of what representation a group is entitled to, this concept is ex-
traordinarily vague. The Court may well have meant a true
percentage group representation-that districting would have to be
such that the 42 percent black population in the new Richmond could
elect 42 percent of the city council. If so, the Court may actually have
been adopting demographic proportionality as the answer to the dis-
tricting conundrum. It seems more likely, however, that the Court
simply did not intend to answer the question.
The Court was similarly able to avoid the question of appropriate
minority voting strength in Beer v. United States.140 In Beer, black citi-
zens challenged a redistricting plan for city council elections in New
Orleans that created one majority-minority district. Plaintiffs argued
that the plan abridged their voting rights because, taken as a percent-
age of the whole (either populace or voters), blacks should have been
able to elect more than one member of the city council. The jurisdic-
tion in Beer, as in City of Richmond, was covered by section 5, so the
Court was able to duck the question of what voting strength was ap-
propriate for the black community in New Orleans by limiting its anal-
ysis to temporal vote dilution. The Court ruled that because the plan
improved black voting strength over what it had been before, it did
not violate the Voting Rights Act, which merely prohibited the dimi-
nution of black voting strength.
139. This portion of the Court's ruling, however, was qualified by its holding that even
if the annexation had no adverse impact on the voting rights of African-Americans and did
not in fact reduce their voting strength, it should nonetheless be undone if the only purpose
for the annexation was an intent to reduce African-American voting strength.
140. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
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The problem arose again the following year in United Jewish Or-
ganizations v. Carey.141 In UJO, the Justice Department concluded,
following the 1970 census, that New York City ought to have two leg-
islative districts in which blacks constituted 65% of the electorate.142
It appears that in making this determination, the Justice Department
was simply applying the same standard of group representation that
the Court had used in City of Richmond, requiring that the voting
strength of African-Americans mirror their percentage in the popula-
tion. In UJO, this result was achieved by dividing the community of
Hasidic Jews in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, which had pre-
viously been concentrated in one district, into two districts. The
Hasidic community sued, alleging that their voting power had been
diluted.
The Court upheld the districting plan. Writing for a plurality,
Justice White proclaimed that "the Constitution does not prevent a
State subject to the Voting Rights Act from deliberately creating or
preserving black majorities in particular districts .... ,,143 Moreover,
in language with great significance for the Shaw case, White stated
that "neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment mandates
any per se rule against using racial factors in districting and
apportionment."144
Justice White then went on to address the more difficult issue.
He noted that in order to draw a black majority district, a State "must
decide how substantial those majorities must be."'1 45 In other words,
the State must choose a quota. Because some number must be cho-
sen, Justice White reasoned, "a reapportionment cannot violate the
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment merely because a State uses spe-
cific numerical quotas in establishing a certain number of black major-
ity districts."'146 The remaining question was whether the particular
quota chosen and the particular district chosen were somehow im-
proper. New York and the United States argued that the percentage
chosen was proper because "the percentage of districts with a non-
white majority roughly approximate the percentage of nonwhites in
141. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
142. Because New York was subject to the preclearance provisions of § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, New York's congressional reapportionment, necessitated by the 1970 census,
had to be approved by the Justice Department.
143. UJO, 430 U.S. at 161.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 162.
146. Id.
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the county."'147 The plurality, however, found it unnecessary to reach
this argument, holding instead that the percentages were proper be-
cause they had been chosen by the Attorney General and were rea-
sonable.148 Thus, the Court once again avoided the question of what
amount of voting power is appropriate for a minority community, in
effect reserving that question for the Justice Department or for local
authorities to decide.
In City of Port Arthur,49 the Court once again avoided deciding
how much voting power is appropriate for a minority group, but in
doing so, it deferred to a lower court ruling that came very close to
requiring fairly strict population proportionality. In Port Arthur, ac-
companying two consolidations and an annexation that altered the ra-
cial balance in the City of Port Arthur, the city made changes to its
city council electoral structure. The council had previously consisted
entirely of at-large representatives. Under the proposed new struc-
ture, some council members would be elected at large, while others
would be elected from districts. The district court required that an
additional change to the electoral structure be made, eliminating the
majority-vote requirement for certain of the at-large seats. In af-
firming, the Supreme Court deferred to the district court, in part be-
cause "whether the.., plan adequately reflected the political strength
of the black minority in the enlarged city was not an issue that could
be determined with mathematical certainty."' 5 0 But even if that lack
of certainty required the Supreme Court to defer, someone, in this
case the district court, had to decide whether the plan "adequately"
reflected the political strength of the black community. What is most
interesting about the Port Arthur case is that the district court finding
to which the Supreme Court deferred was that the plan, unmodified,
would have undervalued the political strength of the black community
because the black community could be expected to elect one-third of
the seats, but blacks made up 40.56% of the population and 35% of
the voting population. It was only the Supreme Court's deference to
the district court that prevented the higher court from having to deal
directly with the question of whether or not one-third of the seats was
the right answer to the districting conundrum.
Thus, it would appear that the districting conundrum has lurked
behind the concept of group vote dilution for almost as long as the
147. Id. at 165.
148. Id at 162-64.
149. City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159 (1982).
150. Id. at 167.
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Supreme Court has employed it. Thus, the Court's subsequent discov-
ery in Holder that communal representation turns on a resolution of
this question should have come as no surprise.
Once the group theory of representation pushes us to answer the
districting conundrum, we can begin to see the problems that arise if
we try to do so. One problem is the fundamentally essentialist nature
of group representation. Group representation assumes that members
of the group will actually be represented if the group is represented.
As with "virtual representation," this assumes that what is most fun-
damental, most essential, about such individuals is their participation
in the group. The group theory of representation thus has the effect of
reducing a multitude of diverse individuals into a single set of inter-
ests, assumed to be shared by all members of the group. In asking
how many representatives we should allocate to African-Americans,
we assume that for each African-American, her African-American-
ness is the most significant aspect of her self, the aspect for which she
most wants representation. That she, as an individual may have per-
spectives and interests different from other African-Americans is
glossed over. What underlies the distress many people feel over
"race-based" districting is precisely this concern-that by allocating
representation on a group basis, we are legitimizing and institutional-
izing stereotypical notions about each group.151
But even if we decide that the vices of essentialism are less criti-
cal than ensuring adequate representation for historically disadvan-
taged groups that by and large will have similar interests and
perspectives, we still have the problem of defining which groups will
151. This tendency towards stereotyping and solipsism has been aptly described by
Elizabeth Spelman: "[E]ssentialism invites me to take what I understand to be true of me
'as a woman' for some golden nugget of womanness all women have as women; and it
makes the participation of other women inessential .... How lovely: the many turn out to
be one and the one that they are is me." ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN:
PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THoUGTrr 159 (1988), quoted in Harris, supra note
83, at 589. Professor Harris criticizes feminist essentialism because it glosses other racial
and other differences among women. Id. at 585, 595-604. Similarly, critics of racial essen-
tialism point to its tendency to gloss over differences among members of a racial group, to
treat them as if they are all alike. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 83, at 1060; Randall
Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L Rnv. 1745, 1782-83, 1801-07
(1989).
Of course, as Professor Aleinikoff points out, "to reject 'essentialism' is not to deny
the significance of the color line in American life," because we can recognize that black
and white experiences may be somewhat different from one another without the reduction-
ism that collapses all black or all white experience into each other. Aleinikoff, supra note
83, at 1094.
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be entitled to representation-for which communities ill we attempt
to answer the districting conundrum?
The problem of defining which communities will be entitled to
representation was starkly illustrated in the UJO case. The Court up-
held the districting plan there, refusing to recognize that the plaintiffs
constituted a distinct ethnic community. Rather, treating the mem-
bers of the Hasidic community simply as white voters, Justice White
wrote that "there was no fencing out of the white population from
participation in the political processes of the county, and the plan did
not minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength.' u52 The
Court's rejection of the Hasidic Jews' position does not reflect any
inconsistency in the Court's communal approach; the Court simply did
not recognize that there was another community whose rights were at
issue.
The Gingles test, which of course did not exist at the time UJO
was decided, only highlights the difficulty. Although it is possible that
the Hasidic Jews in UJO could qualify under Gingles as a group whose
representation could not be diluted, that result would depend on
treating "Hasidic Jews" as a separate group for purposes of the test. If
we treat the plaintiffs in UJO merely as "white voters," we do not
need the Gingles test to tell us that the Court will not protect their
voting strength. Nor is it obvious that it should. The problem is that it
is simply not obvious whether for voting purposes these Hasidic Jews
should be treated as white, or Jewish, or Hasidic, or something else
altogether.
If we are serious about communal representation, we must even-
tually move past the bimodal, "black-white" view of the world that
recognizes only two categories of voters, black and white. In De
Grandy, the Court had no trouble recognizing that there were three
groups of voters in Florida, black, white, and Hispanic, although it
could not solve the problem that increasing the voting strength of
either African-Americans or Hispanics would have the effect of dilut-
ing the voting strength of the other.'5 3 As the population of the
152. UJO, 430 U.S. at 165. It is not clear that Hasidic Jews are a protected group under
the Voting Rights Act, which forbids a denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account
of "race or color .... ." On the other hand, the Hasids might qualify as a Yiddish-speaking
language minority protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (1988) and incorporated by refer-
ence into § 2.
153. The court below in De Grandy found two separate Voting Rights Act violations,
one pertaining to African-Americans and the other pertaining to Hispanics. The Court
found, however, that the remedies for these two violations were mutually exclusive, and
declined to order relief at all.
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United States becomes increasingly diverse, the number of groups
whose voting strength we will have to consider will only increase. It is
difficult to imagine how we will decide which groups qualify.
Even the very notion of distinct groups may prove more elusive
than one might expect. Efforts by federal agencies to devise racial
categories to be used with the next census reveal how difficult it is to
classify a racially and ethnically diverse population and how fluid the
categories devised inevitably will be. 54 Unfortunately, this does not
mean that race has become irrelevant in American society, or that
group representation along racial and ethnic lines is meaningless.
Rather, it suggests that official attempts to define and contain these
categories can be expected to meet with dubious success. Further,
even if we could easily classify the population of the United States
along racial and ethnic lines, it is not clear that we would want to.
Moreover, categories other than race may be seen as significant
here-gender, sexual orientation, disability, all of these qualities may
be seen as equally valid bases of representation. Who will decide in
which category a voter is to be counted? If we parcel out representa-
tion by race, does that mean that women's votes are forever frag-
mented? If we parcel it out by gender, will issues of race be ignored?
In order to decide the districting conundrum, someone is going to
have to assign voters to distinct categories, so that we can figure out
how many voters of each group we have, make our chart, and choose
our result.
The prospect of the government assigning each voter to one and
only one group and allocating representation among those groups is
not an attractive one. These problems certainly give one pause about
efforts to answer the districting conundrum.
In 1993 and 1994, the Supreme Court was confronted with cases
that posed these issues of communal representation perhaps more
sharply than before. Recognizing the difficulties raised by communal
representation and efforts to answer the districting conundrum, the
Court seemed poised to abandon the inquiry. Unfortunately, in doing
so, the Court was responding to only one branch of the paradox-
having forgotten that ignoring the districting conundrum is at least as
bad as trying to answer it.
154. See, e.g., Lawrence Wright, One Drop of Blood, Tr NEw YORKER, July 25,1994,
at 46, 46-50.
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IV. Shaw, De Grandy, and Holder and the Future of the
Voting Rights Act
In Shaw, De Grandy, and Holder, the Supreme Court discovered
the implications of the communal theory of voting, in much the way
that it discovered the implications of the individual approach in Allen
and other similar cases. In Shaw, the court seemed shocked to dis-
cover that majority-minority districts were deliberately created with
race in mind, and did not simply occur as the result of some race-blind
process. In Holder, the Court was squarely faced with the prospect of
having to decide what the voting strength of African-Americans ought
to be, and in De Grandy, the court was confronted with the argument
that demographic proportionality was the right answer to the district-
ing conundrum. Confronted with the hard questions about communal
representation, the Court showed itself inclined to give up and return
to individual representation.
A. Shaw v. Reno
The Court's 1993 opinion in Shaw v. Reno' 55 exposes, but does
not solve, many of the underlying problems in the communal ap-
proach to representation. Prior to Shaw, majority-minority districts,
drawn to effectuate a communal approach to representation, generally
coincided with geographic regions. That is, such districts were drawn
in areas of racially-segregated housing patterns, where a majority-mi-
nority district might look, on a map, like any other politically-drawn
district. In Shaw, however, the Court confronted the question of what
happens when race-based districting becomes divorced from
geography.
The North Carolina district that was challenged in Shaw did not
look like a regularly-drawn district. It was approximately 160 miles in
length, and no wider than Interstate 85, which it followed. As the
Court noted, "Northbound and southbound drivers on 1-85 sometimes
find themselves in separate districts, only to 'trade' districts when they
enter the next county .... At one point the district remains contigu-
ous only because it intersects at a single point with two other districts
before crossing over them.' 56 Suddenly, when the Court looked at
the map, it was obvious that District 12 was a race-based district.
Not that this should have been a surprise to anyone. The district
was created after the North Carolina General Assembly submitted a
155. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
156. ld. at 2821.
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proposed redistricting plan to the Justice Department for preclearance
in accordance with section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The Attorney
General objected to the plan, on the basis that the General Assembly
could have created another majority-minority district "to give effect to
black and Native American voting strength," but had failed to do
So. 1 5 7 The General Assembly then revised the plan, adding District
12. Thus, no one should have been surprised that this majority-minor-
ity district did not simply arise magically from the local geography, but
instead had been deliberately constructed.158
Plaintiffs, white voters in North Carolina, challenged the district
as violative of the 14th Amendment guarantee of equal protection.
Plaintiffs did not allege that the voting strength of white voters had
been diluted, but rather that drawing districts on the basis of race was
itself unconstitutional, regardless of the effect on the voting strength
of a particular group. Thus, Shaw did not so much challenge District
12 as it challenged the very notion of race-based districting.
Confronted with the question in this form, the Court held that
race-based districting is subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although the opinion paid lip-service to Allen and
other cases dealing with the minority voting strength, the case reveals
a Court uncomfortable with the implications of this approach, finding
that districts drawn along racial, rather than geographic, lines "bear[]
an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid."' 59
The role of geography here is somewhat incoherent. If it is im-
permissible to assign voters to districts on the basis of their race, why
should it matter how the district to which they are assigned is
shaped?160 Or put the other way, if it is permissible, indeed desirable,
to assign voters to districts on the basis of their race-and the Court
157. Id. at 2820.
158. The process by which the twelfth district was drawn in North Carolina was some-
what similar to the process by which the electoral districts at issue in UJO were drawn, that
is in response to criteria from the Justice Department. The two cases highlight the differ-
ence between districting in a dense urban area and districting in a rural area. In Brooklyn,
no matter how the lines were drawn, the districts were reasonably "compact," in that they
covered little geographic territory. In Shaw the district sprawled, because the low popula-
tion density meant that the more territory was needed to capture the requisite number of
voters. This suggests that it is easier to "hide" majority-minority districts in cities than in
rural areas, although it is difficult to see why anything of significance should turn on this
difference.
159. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
160. Justice White made exactly this point in his dissent in Shaw: "Given two districts
drawn on similar, race-based grounds, the one does not become more injurious than the
other simply by virtue of being snake-like, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned
and absent any evidence of differential racial impact." Id. at 2841.
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has repeatedly said that it is-how can it become impermissible to do
so when the district to which they are assigned is irregularly-shaped?
The Court in Shaw seemed to say that race-based districting is permis-
sible only when one can't tell from looking at a map that it has been
used and it is therefore possible to pretend that the "majority- minor-
ity" district simply "happened" without anyone ever deliberately
drawing district lines on the basis of race.
A certain amount of spin has been employed to justify this hold-
ing. Justice O'Connor explained that districting was an area in which
"appearances do matter," 161 and others have accepted this explana-
tion and elaborated on it.162 While it may be true, however, that for
political purposes appearances matter, the notion that appearances
could rise to constitutional dimension seems fundamentally wrong. To
say that a districting system is constitutional only when its guiding
principles are concealed seems to be nothing more than institutional-
It would now appear that the majority of the Supreme Court now agrees. Shortly
before this article went to press, the Court decided Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475
(1995), in which it invalidated a Georgia majority-minority district, which although not
"bizarre" on its face was, the Court found, nonetheless drawn predominately to create an
additional "majority-minority" district. In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote,
"Our observation in Shaw of the consequence of racial stereotyping was not meant to
suggest that a district must be bizarre on its face before there is a constitutional violation."
Id. at 2486. Rather, explains the Miller decision, bizarreness is just one indication of an
improper use of race in districting.
161. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827. Not everyone agrees with Justice O'Connor's assess-
ment, however. Taking the other point of view, Louisiana State Senator Dennis Bagneris,
speaking of the district court's decision on remand to dismiss the Shaw case and comparing
it to a Louisiana racial gerrymandering case, asserted, "People vote and will always vote
along racial lines. What difference does it make whether the district looks pretty?" 2
States, 2 Rulings On Race Districting; Supreme Court May Have To Decide, CHiCAGO
Tkm., Aug. 3, 1994, at A4.
162. Pildes and Niemi attempt to argue that appearances matter because a district that
looks racially drawn makes a statement that race is the only important value. Pildes &
Niemi, supra note 11, at 499-506. This appears to be wrong on two counts. First, if "value-
reductionism," the simplification of the political process so that only one value, rather than
many, are taken into account, is wrong, then it ought to be equally wrong whether it is
obvious or obscured. If the legislative decision-making process has been corrupted in some
way that we care about, it is hard to see why it should be actionable only when it is obvi-
ous. (Indeed, it is far from clear why this problem would be subject to judicial review at
all.) Second, the assumption that obvious race-based districts arise from value-reduction-
ism in the first place is flatly contradicted by the facts of Shaw and questionable in any
circumstance. In Shaw, it is clear that had race been the only consideration, a majority-
minority district could easily have been drawn that would have been far more compact
than the actual district that was challenged. The bizarre shape of the district arose from
the opposite of value-reductionism-the efforts of the legislature to accomplish political
and racial goals simultaneously. See Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2842 n.10; see also Daniel D. Polsby
& Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry into the Problem of Racial Gerrymandering Under
the Voting Rights Act 92 MicH. L. Rnv. 652,.653 (1993).
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ized hypocrisy, and as such, I am skeptical that it could be constitu-
tionally required.
I believe that Shaw exposed the districting conundrum in a way
that made the conundrum particularly clear to the public and to the
Court. Without the distractions of geography, the Court could see
that what race-based districting asks is whether we should try to de-
cide the answer to the districting conundrum-whether we should try
to district in such a way as to produce a particular one of the outcomes
on the chart in Table 1. In this regard, it is significant that the plain-
tiffs did not allege that they, the white voters, had been allocated less
representation than they should have received. (Indeed, they did not
even allege that they were white. 163) Rather, they challenged the very
idea that an outcome-any outcome-should be chosen at all. Thus,
the Shaw plaintiffs were not contending that North Carolina had come
up with the wrong answer to the districting conundrum; their point
was that the districting conundrum should not be addressed at all.
The Shaw Court did not entirely accept this argument. To the
extent that the Shaw case posed the question, "Should we care about
the districting conundrum," the court gave an equivocal answer. The
answer seemed to be that yes, we should-or at least we may-care
about the districting conundrum, so long as doing so does not result in
bizarre-looking districts. Even then, the Court left open the possibil-
ity that we might still draw districts to achieve a particular racial allo-
cation of representation, so long as the plan was "narrowly tailored to
further a compelling governmental interest."'" 4 The Court seemed to
be saying that under certain circumstances, it is constitutionally per-
missible for states to consider the districting conundrum.
One year later, in Holder, the Court showed itself less sympa-
thetic to the notion that the Voting Rights Act could be used to re-
quire states to consider the districting conundrum if they were not
otherwise inclined to do so.
B. Holder v. Hall
In Holder v. Hall,165 the Court was presented with a straightfor-
ward application of the communal approach to representation. As in
Allen, it was the African-American community, rather than any indi-
vidual voters, that was being denied representation. But Holder, like
163. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2822.
164. Id. at 2832.
165. 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994).
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City of Richmond, Beer, and UJO, once again raised the question of
what the correct voting strength of African-Americans should be.
In Holder, six African-American registered voters and the local
NAACP chapter in Bleckley County, Georgia, brought constitutional
and Voting Rights Act challenges to the county's single-commissioner
form of government. Bleckley County has been governed by a single
commissioner since the county was founded in 1912. Although Afri-
can-Americans make up 20% of the population in Bleckley County,
no black person has ever run for, or been elected to, the office of
Bleckley County Commissioner. In 1985, the Georgia legislature au-
thorized Bleckley County to adopt a multimember commission con-
sisting of five commissioners elected from single-member districts and
a single chairman elected at large. Bleckley County elected not to
make this change in its county government. Plaintiffs then sued the
incumbent county commissioner and the superintendent of elections
in federal district court, seeking imposition of the five-member
commission.
The district court dismissed both the statutory and constitutional
claims, despite the judge's explicit recognition of racist voting patterns
in the county.166 The Eleventh Circuit reversed on the statutory claim
and held that plaintiffs had proved a violation of section 2 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act. It remanded the case to the district court for formula-
tion of a remedy. The Eleventh Circuit did not consider the
constitutional claim. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari on
the Voting Rights Act claim.
What the plaintiffs were asking the Court to do in Holder was
simply to declare that the districting conundrum mattered in Bleckley
County, even if the state didn't think so, and that zero was an inappro-
priate answer to the question of how much representation a 20% mi-
nority ought to have. But the Court was unwilling to impose the
districting conundrum on a state that had not attempted to answer it:
as the Court conceived the question, it could not say that zero was an
inappropriate answer to the districting conundrum unless it knew
what an appropriate answer would be.
Ironically, the facts of Holder present a fairly easy situation for
solving the districting conundrum. The state had authorized a five-
person commission; if appropriately districted, such a commission
could allocate one representative, that is 20%, to the African-Ameri-
166. As set forth in Holder, "The District Judge stated that, having run for public office
himself, he 'wouldn't run if he were black in Bleckley County."' ld. at 2584.
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can community, which coincidentally made up 20% of the populace.
The majority in Holder, however, was unable to accept this answer,
because there was no principled basis from which the answer was de-
rived-it appeared to be just coincidence that the number of commis-
sioners authorized by the state permitted representation
corresponding to the percentage of African-Americans in the county.
Thus, in Holder the Court looked at the districting conundrum
and couldn't figure out how to begin to answer it. Because the Court
could not determine what the answer to the districting conundrum
should be, it refused to order the state to attempt to answer it.
The Court's decision in Holder consists of six separate opinions,
none of which commanded a majority: (1) Justice Kennedy wrote an
opinion that was joined by Justice Rehnquist and, except for part II.B,
by Justice O'Connor; (2) Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion in which
she concurred in part and concurred in the judgment; (3) Justice
Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the judgment; (4) Jus-
tice Stevens wrote an opinion that was joined by Justices Blackmun,
Souter and Ginsburg, and that was designated as neither a concur-
rence nor a dissent; the opinion took no position on the outcome of
the case, but rather responded to Justice Thomas's opinion; (5) Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, dis-
sented; and (6) Justice Ginsburg wrote her own, separate dissent.
The three opinions which constitute the majority result in Holder
show five of the justices struggling to find some way to avoid taking on
the districting conundrum, in order to avoid confronting a question
they were unwilling to answer. Justice Kennedy cut off the challenge
at the earliest possible moment, arguing that the size of government
was not a "standard, practice or procedure" within the meaning of
section 2. Justice Kennedy concluded that "where there is no objec-
tive and workable standard for choosing a reasonable benchmark by
which to evaluate a challenged voting practice, it follows that the vot-
ing practice cannot be challenged as dilutive under section 2."167
Kennedy noted that in cases arising under section 5, there is automati-
cally a benchmark-that is, section 5 cases present issues of temporal
vote dilution only. Kennedy was unwilling to expand this analysis to
comparative vote dilution. To avoid doing so, he concluded that,
although the size of government might well be a "standard, practice or
procedure" under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, it is not a "stan-
dard, practice or procedure" within the meaning of section 2.
167. Id. at 2586.
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Kennedy's argument has a certain logic, but is nonetheless uncon-
vincing, primarily because of the language of the Voting Rights Act
itself. The logic of the argument arises from the correspondence be-
tween, on the one hand, section 5 and what I have called temporal
vote dilution, and the other hand, section 2 and what I have called
comparative vote dilution. These are two different kinds of vote dilu-
tion, and they raise entirely different issues with respect to the ques-
tion of a benchmark. Justice Kennedy's decision, hinging on the
difference between section 5 and section 2, seeks to make use of this
difference.
The problem is that this is a distinction that Congress did not
make. The language in section 2 is identical to the language in section
5. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that, if anything, the cov-
erage of section 2 is broader than the coverage of section 5. Kennedy
is unable to cite anything in the text or history of section 2 or section 5
to support his notion that the identical phrase should be read differ-
ently in these two different contexts. His argument proceeds from its
conclusion: it would be awkward and difficult (and, presumably, un-
wise) to allow this challenge; therefore, the challenged practice must
not be a "standard, practice, or procedure." Kennedy's argument is a
wishful one, based on the statute he wishes Congress had written, one
that would have been easier for the Court to interpret and enforce,
rather than the statute that Congress actually wrote. Essentially, Ken-
nedy would have us believe that Congress meant two different things
when it used the exact same phrase, because interpretation would be
so much easier if they had.
Justice O'Connor was unwilling to take such an easy way out in
her efforts to get to the same place. She recognized that it was not
simply not possible "to read the terms of section 2 more narrowly than
the terms of section 5."168 She concluded therefore, that the size of
government is a "standard, practice, and procedure" within the mean-
ing of section 2, and directly addressed the problem of comparative
vote dilution.
This approach avoids the most obvious problems with Justice
Kennedy's analysis, but presents problems of its own. Once
O'Connor had determined that the size of the government might be a
challenged under section 2, she needed to come up with some argu-
ment why it could not be so here. She concluded that although the
168. Id. at 2588 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
July 1995]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
size of the government was subject to section 2, a challenge to that
size based on vote dilution was not.
This is an extraordinary argument, for it is difficult to imagine
what other kind of challenge there could possibly be under the Voting
Rights Act to the size of government. O'Connor grounded this argu-
ment in the purported lack of an "objective benchmark" for compara-
tive vote dilution cases. Curiously, however, she did not argue that an
objective benchmark was lacking on the particular facts in front of
her, but rather concluded that "in a section 2 dilution challenge to
size, there can [never] be an objective alternative benchmark."'1 69
Thus, although she arrived at Justice Kennedy's conclusion through a
slightly different route, the difference is really one of language, not
substance. By holding that vote dilution challenges can never be
made to government size under section 2, given that this is the only
kind of meaningful challenge to government size, she in effect con-
cluded that governmental size is not a "standard, practice, or proce-
dure." And, like Justice Kennedy, she reached this conclusion by
focusing on the difference between section 5-in which the challenge
was a temporal one, and thus had what O'Connor calls an "objective
alternative benchmark"-and section 2, in which the challenge was a
comparative one, and therefore, according to Justice O'Connor had
no such benchmark.
Justice O'Connor's opinion is a marvel of slippery-slope-ism. For
in fact, in the case before her, there was an easily ascertainable, objec-
tive benchmark-the five-person commission that the state had au-
thorized the county to adopt. Coincidentally (or perhaps not), this
happened to correspond to the number of commissioners needed to
give African-Americans, who made up one-fifth of the county, repre-
sentation in approximate proportion to their numbers. The problem
for O'Connor then was of the "where will it all end" sort. If we say
that zero representation is too little, how will we avoid saying how
much is enough? And once we decide how much is enough for one
group, how will we avoid saying how much is enough for every group?
What if the state had authorized five commissioners, but the African-
American population was only 15 percent, not enough to control one
of the five seats?170
These are not trivial problems, and it is to Justice O'Connor's
credit that she recognized them. But her opinion, like Justice Ken-
169. Id. at 2589.
170. Id. at 2590.
1516 [Vol. 46
THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
nedy's, adopted a backward form of reasoning to avoid actually grap-
pling with these hard questions. It concluded that because allowing a
section 2 challenge based on comparative dilution would eventually
force the Court to confront these sticky issues, such a challenge must
be impermissible. Put another way, both Justice O'Connor and Jus-
tice Kennedy concluded that the size of Bleckley County's govern-
ment could not be challenged because to do so would require the
Court to recognize the districting conundrum and, more significantly,
to find an answer to it. It is precisely to avoid coming up with an
answer to the districting conundrum that the majority in Holder con-
cluded that governmental size is not subject to a vote-dilution chal-
lenge. It is important to note, too, that the majority gave no
principled reason for avoiding the districting conundrum, other than
the difficulty of answering it. That is, both Justice Kennedy and Jus-
tice O'Connor suggested that if only there were a benchmark, a stan-
dard by which they could evaluate the districting conundrum, they
might be willing to do so. Only because they could not figure out how
a court could answer it, however, did the majority justices conclude
that the question must be avoided.
Curiously, both Kennedy and O'Connor based their holdings on
the allegedly standardless nature of the inquiry the Court would be
forced to conduct without once mentioning the term "justiciability."
Surely a holding that a claim cannot be entertained because of "a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it"171 would seem to be a holding on the grounds of nonjusticiability.
Moreover, the two majority opinions in Holder, which together total
fewer than 10 pages, stand in stark contrast to the exhaustive discus-
sion of justiciability in Baker v. Carr, in which the Court determined
that vote dilution challenges to legislative districting were justiciable.
Nor is it clear that a rigorous justiciability analysis would have led
to the same conclusion as the one that Kennedy and O'Connor
reached. After all, as noted above, the Court had on numerous occa-
sions considered whether districting arrangements were dilutive of mi-
nority voting strength without attempting to answer the potentially
nonjusticiable question of what the appropriate voting strength of the
group should be.172 Indeed, in White, the court had gone so far as to
strike down a multimember districting scheme as dilutive, without
ever addressing what it would consider to be an undiluted voting
171. The Court used precisely this language in Baker v. Carr to describe one of the
categories of nonjusticiable cases. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 28-41.
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strength in that case. Why Holder should be any less justiciable than
White is difficult to see. Nonetheless, a majority of the justices in
Holder, realizing the difficulty of answering the districting conundrum
and actually determining appropriate voting strength, chose instead to
ignore the conundrum.
In his 23-page Holder concurrence, Justice Thomas (joined by
Justice Scalia) took a different approach, urging the Court to limit the
scope of the Voting Rights Act to issues of ballot access and vote
counting, 173 thus defining the districting conundrum out of existence.
In Thomas's view, "[A]s far as the Act is concerned, an 'effective' vote
is merely one that has been cast and fairly counted."'1 74 In essence,
Thomas would overrule Allen and virtually every Voting Rights Act
case since then, and would hold that the Voting Rights Act has noth-
ing to say about the result of the districting conundrum.
Thomas's rejection of the districting conundrum arises directly
from his rejection of anything that smacks of communal representa-
tion. Asserting (with very little basis) that section 2 is focused on the
"individual voter," he concludes that "[g]iving the term 'standard,
practice or procedure' an expansive interpretation to reach potentially
dilutive practices ... would distort that focus on the individual, for a
vote dilution claim necessarily depends on the assertion of a group
right.' 75 Thus, Thomas would hold that "standard, practice or proce-
dure" "reach[es] only state enactments that limit citizens' access to the
ballot."'1 76 Thomas is calling for a return to a purely individual notion
of representation and an out-and-out rejection of communal or group
representation.
Thomas made two distinct arguments in support of his position.
First, he argued that any other approach amounts to a judicial imple-
mentation of what he calls "political theory," and second, he argued
that the Voting Rights Act itself requires his interpretation.
173. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2602.
174. Id. at 2605 (Thomas, J., concurring).
175. Id. Thomas's argument that the Voting Rights Act incorporates a purely individ-
ual notion of representation appears to arise solely from the fact that § 2(a) refers to the
right of "any citizen" to vote. Thomas argued that because "any citizen" is singular, the
focus of the Act must be on the individual. This ignores not only the possibility that the
singular was chosen for grammatical convenience, but also the fact that while § 2(a) is
arguably focussed on individual voters, § 2(b) clearly speaks of "members of a class of
citizens," as well as safeguarding the rights of such class members "to elect representatives
of their choice," a phrase, which as we have seen, can only refer to a communal conception
of voting and representation.
176. Id. at 2592.
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Thomas's political theory argument was simply that the group
theory of representation results from a particular choice of political
theory. Thomas treated "political theory" as if it were a dangerous
animal, to be avoided at all costs. It was sufficient for him to brand an
idea as nothing but "political theory" for him to conclude that the idea
must therefore be rejected out of hand. It never seemed to occur to
Thomas that the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act represent
political theory choices, which it is then the Court's obligation to in-
terpret and enforce.
Thomas understood, and made explicit as the other justices seem
unwilling to do, that geographic representation itself is nothing more
than a political theory choice. Once we begin to shift to a group-cen-
tered notion of representation, geography may well have to be aban-
doned. Thomas saw, too, the Court's hypocrisy in permitting race-
based districts only when the districts are drawn in such a way that
one cannot tell, from looking at a map, that they are in fact race-
based, while shying away from race-based districts as soon as they
look like what they are. Thus, Thomas noted that "rather than requir-
ing registration on racial rolls and dividing power purely on a popula-
tion basis, we have simply resorted to the somewhat less precise
expedient of drawing geographic district lines to capture minority
populations."'1 77
Thomas recognized, in the second half of his opinion, that his no-
tions of "political theory" depend on a particular interpretation of the
Voting Rights Act and he turns to the Act to argue that it supports his
version of political theory, rather than that of his opponents. It is here
that his argument falls apart.
Thomas made two arguments about the Voting Rights Act. First,
he argued when Congress amended section 2(a) in 1982, it was not
thereby incorporating and enacting the group notions of representa-
tion found in the Allen case. Thomas conceded that the Court "gener-
ally will assume that reenactment of specific statutory language is
intended to include a 'settled judicial interpretation' of that lan-
guage, '178 but argued that Allen did not, in 1982, represent the settled
judicial interpretation of section 2. Allen was already 13 years old in
1982, so Thomas needed some fancy footwork here. He got around
the point with a quick and superficial argument: Allen was a section 5
case; there was no reason to conclude, in 1982, that it applied to sec-
177. I& at 2599.
178. Id. at 2606.
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tion 2 as well. What this argument misses is that by 1982, Allen was
hardly the only case adopting an expansive, group-centered view of
the Voting Rights Act. As noted above, by 1982, the group approach
to representation was well-entrenched in cases interpreting the Voting
Rights Act. Moreover, although some of these other cases were, like
Allen, section 5 cases, some, like City of Rome, were in fact brought
under section 2.
Thomas argued that the Court should look to Mobile rather than
to Allen as the last word on section 2 at the time of the 1982 re-enact-
ment of the Voting Rights Act. Thomas seems somehow to have over-
looked the fact that Congress amended and reenacted the Act in 1982
precisely to overrule Mobile. Thus, the notion that Congress was in-
corporating Mobile is simply untenable. Moreover, to the extent that
Congress intended to incorporate into the 1982 amendments those
portions of the Mobile opinion that it did not expressly overrule, Mo-
bile itself adopts and applies the Allen concept of group vote dilution
which arises from a group theory of representation.
Thomas found an even greater challenge in his attempt to deal
with section 2(b) of the Act. After all, section 2(b) commands the
Court to look at whether members of a minority group "have less op-
portunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice." Con-
gress's use of this phrase refutes Justice's Thomas's argument that the
Voting Rights Act is limited to questions of ballot access and counting.
Congress could not have made it clearer that it intended the Court to
look at the results of elections, and that if minority groups did not
have a chance actually to elect (not merely to vote for) representatives
of their choice, then they had not been accorded the full protections of
the Voting Rights Act. Thomas essentially ignored this language in
order to conclude that the Voting Rights Act has nothing to say about
the rights of anyone actually to elect a representative.
Thomas ran into even greater difficulty with the language in sec-
tion 2(b) that directs the court to consider "the extent to which mem-
bers of a protected class have been elected to office." Thomas
recognized that he must explain away this language if his argument
was to stand. Thus, he argued that this factor is included because it
could conceivably be used as a surrogate for other information to
show that members of a group were denied access to the polls. And
while one cannot say that these words couldn't mean what Thomas
says, that is hardly their most natural or plainest meaning. For a pair
of self-proclaimed textualists, Justices Thomas and Scalia are remark-
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ably uninterested in the text that Congress actually wrote, as opposed
to the one they believe Congress ought to have written.
What Thomas so fears that he is willing to turn the clock back to
1969 to avoid, is representation based on demographic proportional-
ity. That Thomas fears this most strongly of anyone on the Court is
not surprising, as it is most obviously threatening to him. Demo-
graphic proportionality assumes that members of a group are more
like one another than they are like members of other groups. More-
over, the government determines to which "group" an individual be-
longs. As a conservative Republican African-American, Thomas may
feel quite strongly that being grouped with other African-Americans
will not cause him to be better represented; his opinion in Holder
demonstrates how acutely aware he is that not all African-Americans
think alike, and that to be assigned to an "African-American district"
would disenfranchise him as surely as the African-American commu-
nity is disenfranchised in Bleckley County.
In order to avoid this, Thomas is prepared to return to a pre-
Allen understanding of voting rights. He is apparently willing to ac-
cept a narrowed focus that would be incapable of discerning racial
discrimination so long as every individual gets to cast a ballot, and to
sanction elections that could be little more than a sham, the result
determined in advance through manipulation of district lines. He is so
focused on what he believes to be the dead end ahead of him, that he
is oblivious to the fact that the road he is switching to leads equally to
a dead end.
In an opinion labelled neither a concurrence nor a dissent, and
addressed solely to the Thomas-Scalia concurrence, Justice Stevens
made this point. Stevens provided a history of the Voting Rights Act,
and the cases under it, a reminder that there was a reason that Con-
gress and the Court began to use a group notion of representation in
the first place. Thomas touted individual representation as the pan-
acea for the problems of Voting Rights Act jurisprudence; Stevens re-
minded him that individual representation has already been tried, and
its problems were at least as serious as the ones raised by the group
approach.
The dissenters in Holder didn't do much better than those in the
majority at confronting the difficult issues of representation inherent
in the case. Instead, Justice Blackmun, writing for himself and Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, found that he didn't have to. The
questions raised by Justice O'Connor may indeed be hard questions-
in another case. The facts before them, however, are not so difficult.
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As Justice Blackmun made clear, a majority of the Court in
Holder held that governmental size is a "standard, practice, or proce-
dure" within the meaning of section 2. Given that holding (and unlike
Justice O'Connor, the fifth justice who agreed that governmental size
is a "standard, practice or procedure") the dissenters proceeded to the
case-specific analysis of the vote dilution challenge before them. On
the facts before them, they found a reasonable and objective bench-
mark in the five-member commission authorized by the state. They
did not decide whether this was the best form of government, or the
only form that does not violate the statute. Rather, they would have
held only that compared to the benchmark, the form of county gov-
ernment actually employed impermissibly diluted the voting strength
of the black community.
Thus, the dissenters leave for another day Justice O'Connor's
hard questions: What if African-Americans were only 15 percent of
Bleckley County? Would the single-commissioner form of govern-
ment still be illegal, since the benchmark form wouldn't provide rep-
resentation either? Would the benchmark itself be illegal? What
other groups are there in Bleckley County, and how large do they
have to be before they, too, can demand representation in county gov-
ernment? Holder, like Shaw, avoids these questions by deciding that
we need not, should not, address the districting conundrum.
In De Grandy, on the other hand, the Court reviewed Florida's
answer to the districting conundrum, and in doing so defined certain
parameters for dealing with the question. Thus, the Court went from
holding, in Holder, that the conundrum should not be addressed be-
cause there is no basis on which to answer it, to defining, in De
Grandy, how to go about answering it.
C. Johnson v. De Grandy
In Johnson v. De Grandy,179 plaintiffs challenged the new district-
ing plan for the Florida House of Representatives and the Florida
Senate. The plan created majority-minority districts for both African-
Americans and Hispanics. Plaintiffs alleged, however, that even more
majority-minority districts could have been created, and that failure to
do so violated the Voting Rights Act. Thus, the plaintiffs in De
Grandy asked precisely the question we posed at the beginning: How
many representatives ought each group to have?
179. 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
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The majority opinion in De Grandy'80 is notable for its measured
approach to this sticky question. Justice Souter rejected outright the
notion that the Voting Rights Act, or any, of the cases construing it,
required Florida to maximize the number of majority-minority dis-
tricts. Souter used the example that a 40 percent minority could con-
ceivably control seven out of ten seats if maximization were required.
Using the figures proposed in Part 1, we saw that a 30 percent minor-
ity could control up to 50 percent of the seats, if carefully districted.
Given these figures, Souter had no trouble concluding that maximiza-
tion was not required. (Indeed, confronted with these numbers, it is
difficult to make a principled argument for maximization, at least in
the general case.)
Florida further argued, however, that the Court should declare
demographic proportionality a "safe harbor," so that a plan adopting
demographic proportionality could not be challenged.'81 The Court
declined to do so, preferring instead to rely in each case on the "total-
ity of the circumstances." The majority's refusal to adopt demo-
graphic proportionality as a safe harbor rested on a measured analysis
and understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of race-based dis-
tricting. Souter began by noting that a safe harbor might trade the
rights of some members of a minority group against the rights of
others, by combining blatant gerrymandering in one part of the State
with offsets elsewhere, for an overall proportional result. But the ma-
jority's objection to demographic proportionality went much deeper:
"It bears recalling," wrote Souter, that
for all the virtues of majority-minority districts as remedial devices,
they rely on a quintessentially race-conscious calculus aptly de-
scribed as the 'politics of second best' .... If the lesson of Gingles is
that society's racial and ethnic cleavages sometimes necessitate ma-jority-minority districts to ensure equal political and electoral op-
portunity, that should not obscure the fact that there are
communities in which minority citizens are able to form coalitions
with voters from other racial and ethnic groups, having no need to
180. There are four opinions in De Grandy: Souter wrote for the majority, joined by
Rehnquist, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor, and by Kennedy in all but parts III.B.2,
II.B.4, and IV; Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence; Justice Kennedy wrote an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment; and Justices Thomas and Scalia
dissented in an opinion by Thomas that simply incorporates by reference their concurring
opinion in Holder.
181. Florida did not go so far as to suggest that population proportionality should be
the only correct answer to the districting conundrum. The Court foresaw, however, that if
it were to create such a safe harbor, states and local governments would adopt it as the
only correct answer, since it would be the only answer that would avoid litigation
altogether.
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be a majority within a single district in order to elect candidates of
their choice. Those candidates may not represent perfection to
every minority voter, but minority voters are not immune from the
obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground,
the virtue of which is not be slighted in applying a statute meant to
hasten the waning of racism in American politics.182
Souter tells us that the answer to the districting conundrum is
neither five nor three, that there is no "answer," only a case-by-case
process of ensuring that minority groups are not disenfranchised while
attempting to avoid the worst excesses of race-based districting.
But the majority's measured approach stops short of actually
dealing with the districting conundrum. Souter's answer seems to be
that if the answer is not egregious, the Courts have nothing to say
about it; the question is one for the legislature. Moreover, Souter can
articulate no standards for when the answer will be egregious-rn
drawing district lines that will determine whether the 30 percent mi-
nority gets zero, one, two, three, four or five seats, a state or political
subdivision can expect no easy guidance from the courts. Even an
answer of zero is not always egregious, as in the Holder case.
Interestingly, although Souter referred to race-based districting
as "second-best," he made no effort to identify what would be best. It
is possible that he was referring only to the ideal picture of racial har-
mony he described as obtaining in some communities-a race-blind
world in which there is no districting conundrum, because racial mi-
norities are not treated as distinct units of the polity, so the question
of how many seats to allocate simply does not arise. By focusing ex-
clusively on an ideal, however, the majority missed the chance to rec-
ognize another way around the problems of individual and communal
representation, via proportional representation.
The majority opinion nowhere suggests that such a way out is
needed. Souter's opinion suggests a stable, incremental process, in
which race-based districting is used, with court approval, when neces-
sary while the populace moves toward a system in which such district-
ing will eventually be obsolete. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion,
however, sounds a wake-up call from this happy daydream.
Kennedy agreed with the majority on the fundamental holdings
of De Grandy, that maximization of minority representation is unnec-
essary and that demographic proportionality provides no safe harbor.
He agreed, too, that some degree of race-based districting is required
182. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2661 (citations omitted).
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by the Voting Rights Act. Unlike the majority, however, he is not
comfortable with where this process is leading.
Kennedy noted that "[a]s a general matter, the sorting of persons
with an intent to divide by reason of race raises the most serious con-
stitutional questions. 18 3 He reminded the states to "bear in mind that
redistricting must comply with the overriding demands of the Equal
Protection clause."1 4 Having acknowledged that race-based district-
ing is required in some circumstances by the Voting Rights Act, and
having noted that such districting is probably an Equal Protection vio-
lation, Kennedy seemed poised to draw the obvious conclusion.
When he did not do so, his reasoning was ominous: "But no constitu-
tional claims were brought here, and the court's opinion does not ad-
dress any constitutional issues."185 Kennedy seemed clearly to be
indicating that if constitutional questions were raised, he would have
to complete his syllogism. In this way, Kennedy's opinion in De
Grandy echoes the majority opinion in Shaw. But Shaw was ad-
dressed only to the legality of the plan before the Court, and the
Court did not address the question of whether the plan about which it
expressed reservations in that case was in fact required by the Voting
Rights Act. Kennedy made explicit in De Grandy what was not ad-
dressed in Shaw: the extent to which a constitutional infirmity in race-
based districting may in fact be a constitutional defect in the Voting
Rights Act itself.
It is not inconceivable that a majority of the Court could eventu-
ally conclude that Voting Rights Act does indeed adopt a communal
view of representation and that to the extent that it does, it is uncon-
stitutional.18 6 Justice O'Connor has already expressed her reserva-
tions about race-based districting in Shaw. Justices Thomas and Scalia
183. Id. at 2666.
184. Id at 2667.
185. Id.
186. As this article was going to press, the Court's decision in Miller v. Johnson seemed
to confirm the justices' growing uneasiness with race-based districting and with the Voting
Rights Act. Justice Kennedy once again suggested that the Voting Rights Act might be
unconstitutional; he did more than suggest that it would be unconstitutional as interpreted
by the Justice Department, noting that "the Justice Department's implicit command that
States engage in presumptively unconstitutional race-based districting brings the Voting
Rights Act, once upheld as a proper exercise of Congress' authority... into tension with
the Fourteenth Amendment." 115 S. Ct. 2475,2493 (1995). (That "once upheld" can only
be read as a reminder and a warning that Supreme Court approval of the Act is not neces-
sarily permanent.) Once again, however, Kennedy saw no need to reach the question of
the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. By rejecting the Justice Department's inter-
pretation, the majority "avoid[s] the constitutional problems that interpretation raises."
Id. It would appear that the Court prefers to reinterpret the Voting Rights Act until it no
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might be willing to concede that the statute does have a broad reach,
if that were a steppingstone on a path to getting rid of it altogether. It
is not too far-fetched to believe that Justice Rehnquist might also
adopt this view. For this reason, if for no other, those who are con-
cerned about voting rights ought not to content themselves with the
"second-best" solution of race-based districting.
D. What's Next?
(1) The End of the Road
In Shaw, Holder, and De Grandy, the Court came face-to-face
with all of the limitations of the communal approach to representa-
tion. The Court did not abandon this approach, despite the urging of
Justices Thomas and Scalia's to do so, but it did not show any great
level of comfort with it either.187 If communal representation is even-
tually to be limited, as these cases suggest, the question remains, How
will we conceptualize representation instead? How will we answer the
districting conundrum?
Thomas and Scalia offer a quick answer-return to individual
representation (and abandon the districting conundrum)-but there is
no reason to believe that individual representation will do a better job
of providing representation for minorities in the next century than it
did in the 1960s. Indeed, there is a good argument that the problems
with individual representation that arose in cases like Allen arose
from a fundamental flaw in this theory and that the individual theory
of representation is unsuitable to a diverse, multicultural society, be-
cause its fundamental incoherence denies representation to minori-
ties. But even if we accept that individual representation leads us to a
dead end, we must still grapple with the difficulties of group represen-
tation, and with the difficulties of attempting to answer the districting
conundrum. Justice Thomas is not wrong in fearing that creation of
"black districts," "Hispanic districts," etc., will create new problems,
longer requires or permits race-based districting, rather than take the bolder step of strik-
ing it down. But in either case, the effect is much the same.
187. Even in Miller v. Johnson, decided in June of this year, the Court did not entirely
abandon communal representation or race-based districting, and it seems unlikely at this
point that the majority would have enough votes to do so. Justice O'Connor's concurrence
emphasizes that for her, at least, the problems with race-based districting are limited to the
few, what she views as exceptional, cases in which a state has acted "in substantial disre-
gard of customary and traditional districting practices." 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). For Justice O'Connor, at least, some consideration of race in districting re-
mains appropriate. And even Justice Kennedy's opinion leaves open, at least for now,
what role racial consideration can play and what interests justify those considerations.
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not least of which is the pernicious stereotyping of members of minor-
ity groups-the assumption that "they" are all alike (and different
from "us"). Even the proponents of race-based districting refer to it
as the "second-best" solution.-88
What then, is the best solution? If we can neither ignore the dis-
tricting conundrum nor answer it, what are we to do? Unless we can
conjure into a being a society in which all racism magically disappears,
the elimination of both individual representation and communal rep-
resentation suggests that we consider a third, untried, alternative:
proportional representation.
(2) Proportional Representation
Proportional representation is not one system of voting. Rather,
the term proportional representation refers to any system of voting in
which (1) candidates are elected from multimember districts; (2) can-
didates do not need to receive a plurality or a majority in order to be
elected; and (3) seats are allocated in proportion to the number of
votes each candidate or candidate party received.189
Proportional representation bears some relationship to commu-
nal representation, but with an important difference. In communal
representation, the group that is represented is a racial or ethnic com-
munity, while in proportional representation, it is a community of self-
selected individuals who come together for the purpose of an election.
Thus, while communal representation is rigid, and must define and
assign each individual to one category or another, proportional repre-
sentation is fluid. Each individual chooses to align herself now with
this group, then with that, depending on the circumstances. Represen-
tation is simultaneously individual and communal. Where a racial or
ethnic community feels itself to be threatened communally, its mem-
bers may vote communally-but they need not do so in circumstances
when they do not perceive their interests to be communal. Indeed,
one would expect that the degree to which voting takes place along
racial lines in a proportional representation system would correspond
to the degree to which the community was in fact fractured along ra-
cial lines.
Proportional representation is neither a new idea nor a particu-
larly revolutionary one. Its logic was so compelling to John Stuart
188. See De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2661 (quoting B. GROFmAN Er AL., MIoRmTY REP-
RESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY (1992)).
189. See AMY, supra note 29, at 14 (1993).
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Mill that he referred to winner-take-all systems as "false democ-
racy."1 90 He argued:
Because the majority ought to prevail over the minority, must the
majority have all the votes, the minority none? Is it necessary that
the minority should not even be heard? ... In a really equal democ-
racy every or any section would be represented, not disproportion-
ately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always
have a majority of the representatives, but a minority of the electors
would always have a minority of the representatives. Man for
man19' they would be as fully represented as the majority. Unless
they are, there is not equal government, but a government of ine-
quality and privilege: one part of the people rule over the rest;
there is a part whose fair and equal share of influence in the repre-
sentation is withheld from them, contrary to all just government,
but, above all, contrary to the principle of democracy, which pro-
fesses equality as its very root and foundation.' 92
Variations of proportional representation are in use in Austria,
Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Finland,
Italy, Iceland, Belgium, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Israel, Luxem-
bourg and Spain.193 In Cambridge, Massachusetts, city council and
school committee elections use a system of proportional representa-
tion.194 Recently, it has been championed by Lani Guinier and
others. 95 Still others have noted the connection between the problem
of gerrymandering and proportional representation as a potential
solution. 96
It is not my purpose here to repeat the arguments that these ad-
vocates have made on behalf of proportional representation, nor to
advocate for the adoption of any one particular system of propor-
tional representation. 97 Rather, I wish to argue only that, given the
190. MILL, supra note 84, at 102-03.
191. Mill was a strong advocate of suffrage for women, so he can perhaps be forgiven
for writing in the male-dominated idiom of his time.
192. MILL, supra note 84, at 103-04.
193. AMY, supra note 29, at 28.
194. Id. at 11.
195. See Guinier, supra note 13; see also Karlan, supra note 13; Mary A. Inman, Com-
ment, C.P.R. (Change Through Proportional Representation): Resuscitating a Federal Elec-
toral System, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1991 (1993); Note, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies
for Unlawful At-Large Systems, 92 YALE L.J. 144 (1982) [hereinafter Alternative Voting
Systems].
196. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of
Proportional Representation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 257, 261 (1985).
197. Others have lucidly described cumulative voting, limited voting, single-transfera-
ble voting ("S.T.V."), modified S.T.V., and other variations. See, e.g., AMY, supra note 29,
at 13-20; George R. Hallet Jr., Proportional Representation with the Single Transferable
Vote: A Basic Requirement for Legislative Elections, in CHOOSING AN ELEcrORAL SYs-
TEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 113, 1117-19 (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman, eds.,
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past failures of individual representation and the imminent failure of
communal representation, proportional representation may be the
only system of representation that can solve the problems of an elec-
torate divided along racial and ethnic lines without resorting to elabo-
rate governmental classifications of voters along these lines.
Proportional representation results neither in "political
apartheid" nor in institutionalized racism. It mirrors the reality of so-
ciety's divisions, without creating or institutionalizing them. It takes
us outside the districting conundrum, by telling us that any group
should be represented in proportion to its numbers, but that. the con-
cept of "group" is far more complex and variable than the notions of
communal representation recognize.
On the other hand, proportional representation should not been
seen as a panacea for all electoral ills. To begin with, no "ideal" sys-
tem of proportional representation has yet been devised. Existing sys-
tems suffer from a variety of flaws, including systems that require
sophisticated strategies in order to maximize voting potential,198 sys-
tems that require sophisticated computer programs to tally the votes
(which thus may be unintelligible to the electorate), 99 and systems
that enhance (perhaps more than is desirable) the control of political
parties.200
In addition, some have expressed concerns that proportional rep-
resentation systems are destabilizing.20' The argument is that by giv-
ing representation to a greater range of viewpoints, proportional
representation systems give voice and legitimacy to "crackpot" views
and make it more difficult for excessively diverse legislatures to ac-
complish anything. These arguments may be seen as antidemocratic
1984); Karlan, Maps and Misreadings, supra note 13, at 221-36; Inman, supra note 195, at
1999-2000; Alternative Voting Systems, supra note 195, at 148-54.
198. Cumulative voting, for example, gives each voter as many votes as there are seats
and permits the voter to divide those votes in any way she chooses, all for one candidate,
divided among two or more, etc. To make the most effective use of her votes, a voter will
have to make sophisticated guesses about which candidates will need her to aggregate her
votes, how many of her votes she should aggregate, etc.
199. I am referring here to modified single-transferable voting, which has the virtue,
perhaps, of best replicating the views of the electorate, but is so complicated that voters
may have little confidence in the system because they cannot understand it.
200. Party-list systems, in which voters vote for a party, the party is allocated a number
of seats depending on its proportion of the vote, and the party determines who holds the
seats, would seem to concentrate much greater power in the hands of political parties than
exists now.
201. I am indebted to numerous members of the faculty at Western New England Col-
lege School of Law, including Howard Kalodner, Anne Goldstein, and Jim Gardner, for
articulating many of these arguments.
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arguments, that is arguments that some people, some points of view,
must be denied representation as the price of political stability. Alter-
natively, such arguments may be seen merely as arguments about
what point in the political process minority groups should be expected
to "pull, haul and trade to find common political ground. '202 Thus,
the argument would go, the full panoply of viewpoints is, and should
be heard, prior to elections, and the horse-trading and compromising
that may be required to build coalitions among diverse groups should
occur in the context of nominating and electing representatives. The
business of representatives, in this view, is not to have a conversation
among all the diverse views of society, but rather, having eliminated
all but the most common, to go about governing in accordance with
those views.203 The assessment of such arguments is, however, beyond
the scope of this article. Clearly, both the strengths and the weak-
nesses of proportional representation need to be more fully explored.
But it appears that we. have reached the time for that exploration to
take place.
We have seen that the Court's voting rights jurisprudence has
moved in an inchoate progression from an individual conception of
representation to a group conception of representation. The group
conception came to the fore as the individual approach proved une-
qual to the task of dealing with the racist implications of the districting
conundrum. The Court's recent voting rights cases, however, suggest
that, having discovered the difficulties of group representation, the
Court is contemplating a return to an individual approach. Thus, to
the extent that Allen represented the exhaustion of individual thinking
about districting, Shaw, Holder, De Grandy, and now Miller may rep-
resent the exhaustion of communal thinking about districting.
However, even if the Court has correctly identified weaknesses in
the communal approach to representation, that does not mean that a
return to the individual approach is in order. If we are to avoid end-
lessly retrying solutions that have already failed, we must think about
voting and representation in a new way. If Shaw, Holder, De Grandy
and Miller are a signal that communal representation is faltering, then
their message is that we have two choices: We can follow Justice
202. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2661 (1994).
203. Professor Karlan has argued that small legislative bodies, where representatives
know each other, where voting is not anonymous, where there is an institutional setting for
debate, and where voting occurs frequently, are much better settings for coalition-building
and the working out of group differences than elections. Karlan, supra note 13, at 216-18.
Moreover, the extremely low voter turnout in this country may suggest that not much
pulling, hauling or trading is in fact going on at the electoral stage.
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Thomas, back to an individual approach to representation that didn't
work thirty years ago, or we can move forward to the twenty-first cen-
tury with a new vision of representation and democracy by way of
some form of proportional representation.
Conclusion
At the end of Angels in America, Tony Kushner provides an an-
swer to the Angel's reactionary call: "The world only spins forward.
We will be citizens. The time has come." °4 In the end, this is the
answer to Justice Thomas's reactionary call as well. 'The court cannot
work its way out of its voting rights conundrum by going backward.
History and case law demonstrate that. The Court must move for-
ward, to craft a path beyond the two dead ends it has already ex-
plored. Justice Souter's opinion in De Grandy is a beginning, but
some form of proportional representation may well be the only road
out.
204. KusHNER, supra note 1, at 148 (1992).
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